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CHAPTER I 
A BACKGROUlID STUDY OF THE MOROCCAN SITUATIOJ' 
Morocoo, or Maghreb-el-Ak.a--the ley ot the West --i8 a oountry in 
ortheastern Atrioa, acrolS the Mediterranean Sea from Gibraltar. Some 
i.torians olaim that it il the mOlt desirable ot the North African oountrie., 
oause ot it. fertility, its natural resouroes, and it. geogr~phioal position. 
it i. alightly larger than France, and its population in 1904 was 
bout tive ml11ion. Tbe ollmate 1, plea.ant, and due to the rioh Boil of tbe 
alleys and plain., agriculture i8 one ot its chiet ocoupation.. Every known 
riety of vegetable and grain can be raised there, and Mcrocco could ea8i1y 
upply all the market. ot Europe with early spring vegetable •• l 
The Atlas mountains shelter the country from winds, storms, and the 
at ot the desert. BecaU8e the mountain pasture. are among the fine.t 
grazing distriots ot the world, the sheep industry i8 very important. Not 
only have the mountains attected the climate and industry of the oountry, but 
they have exercised a ~reat intluenoe upon the history and government of 
Moroooo. Slnoe aeveral mountain ohains eros. the country, the division ot t 
country into numerous provinoes has prevented the organization of a well 
united government. Thus, it 18 not surprising to tind tribal independenoe, 
1 w. D. Harris, Intervention ~ Colonization ~ Atrica, BOlton, 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914, 243. 
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local jealousies and personal rivalries existing in Morocco. 
No doubt this disunity is further acoentuated by the lack ot good 
roads and ot modern means of transportation. Hindered thus by the mountain 
ohains and poor transportation, the central government of Maghzen haa been 
unable to subjeot the barbarous Berber tribes in the mountaina, or the Arabs 
and Koor. in the plains. Aotually, only a certain number of tribes were 
direotly aubjeot to the Sultan, while the others were a law unto the.elvel. 
What then was the great attraotion held by European countries tor 
Morocco! Was it the arricultural products' Its sheep industry' It. 
geographical importance7 
Whatever the annar may be. it is true that in the early twentieth 
~entury several European oGuntriea were loo~inr longingly at Morocco. 
Beginning with the 1870' s there •• a renewed intereat in overseas expansion 
~mong the leading oountries of Europe. This followed a period trom 1840 to 
870 when there ftl a marked dec11ne of European impedalie. .A. tew 
xceptiona oharaoterize thia time, luoh aa Napoleon IIIta eftorts to ~38~re~t 
oolonial empire for France, and a few additions made by the British in India. 
~ut generally speaking, wide-spread colonial expansion was laoking. 
A favorite explanation of why European imperialism resumed in the 
870' a i. an eoonomic one, baled on the following statement. 
It was advanoed originally by publioiltl and statesmen to win the support 
of business interests for imperalistio polioies. Marxian writers took up 
the argument and integrated it with their dogma ot materialistic 
determination, reasoning then that, imperialism ts an ir1lJl'ltable phase in 
the evolution of capitalism, a phase in which 8urplu8 capital, accumulated 
. by the exploration ot domestio labor, 1s obliged by diminishing returns 
3 
., 
at home to find new outlet. for investment abroad.2 
"'hiB new imperialism then would be one of investinr a8 well as one 
of oolonizing. To oarry the economio argument further, some olaim that the 
need of raw materials neoessitated the aoquisition of new oolonie •• 
HoweTer, this argument, based solely on eoonomic reasons, would seem 
to rln~ false when the fGllowin~ conditions are considered. RU8sia and Italy 
participated in the 8cramb1e for colonies, although they had no surplus 
manufaotured ,:oods to sell, nor surplus money to invest. LikeTliae, Germany, 
who greatly exoeeded France in industrial deTelopment, _8 tar outdistanced 
by France in aoquiring more territory. 
Baaically, then, the new imperialism _, a nationalistio phenomenon. 
It was a psychological reaction to maintain or reCOTer natiomal pre8ti~e.3 
Such seemed to be the cale of England, who, isolated in Europa, would enlarge 
the Dri tish Empire J of France who, ha"inr, suffered losses in Em·ope, would 
turn elsewhere for oompensation, ot Ru .. !a who, halted in the Balkans, would 
alain turn to Asia. of Germany and Italy Who, haTing united their oountries, 
wished to extend their prestige OTeraeas. It _s then only those oountries 
~ho _nted to increase their powerful position in the eyes of the world that 
joined this imperialistic race, the oountries without prestige were noticeably 
absent in the soramble. 
England felt the need of increased power durin, these decade. 
2 C. J. H. Bayes, A Generation of Materialism, New York, Harper & 
Bros., 1941, 217. - --
3 .!2.!!., 220. 
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(1670-19OO t l), linoe she and Russia were at odda over their expansions in the 
Near East. she and Oermany were rivals 1n naval production) and she and 
France were traditional enemies, whos. animolity had inoreased over oolonlal 
di,putea. France, navln£ just lost land ae a result of the Franoo-Pruee1an 
Vlar, wanted to eave taoe in the eye. of the world by aoquiring an extend ..... 
empire. Ruesia, faoing an lnterruptiqn ot her Balk:an oampaign, turned not to 
Atrica, as did the other powers, but to Asb.. The al.tuatiOL of Oarmany and 
Italy d1. ttered from that of the other Great Powerl 1n that they were not 
relumln" but starting tho ta.k of building empires. Both entered the 
oolonial field late, because of a delayed unifioation of their own oountrie •• 
While the other. were vieing tor oolonie. many years before, o.rmany and 
Italy were struggling to unit. their many prOVinces into strone nationalistio 
statel, and had just sucoeeded 1n 80 d01n, prior to this period. 
Then began a series of diplomatio allianoe. amonr these countries 
to in.ure BUooe.stul oolonial aotivity. The first of the •• arNe.nts oame in 
1879, when G .... ny and Austria-Hungary, signed 'What became the Dual Alliance. 
This alliance 'WaS of ahort duration, however, for in 1852 ltal~,.. ~oined with 
Germany and Austria to form the Triple Alliance. Realisinr, that without the 
aupport of aome stronger nation, it would be impoaslble to aoquire new 
possessions, Italy aooepted the opportunity to join forces with the a1gnatorie. 
of the Dual Alliance. Thus began an alUanae which _s to exist until 1915. 
Yost of the agreements made durin, this period olaimed to be defensive in 
charaoter. The two following artioles from the Triple Allianoe bear this oute 
Artiole S. 
Should one ot the aignatory I_rt1e8 be drawn into war with III powr not 
-5 
belonging to the alllanoe. the two others are pledged to obserYe a 
benevolent neutrality toward the aignatory power. 
Artiole ,. 
Should one ot the signatory parties be attacked without provocation, 
tor whatever cause, by a power not belonginf: to the alliance. the 
two other parties are bound to furnish help and asaistanoe with all 
their strength to the party attacked.' 
In the years immediately tollowinr this treaty Italy showed 
~onsiderable interest in Tripoli and CyrenaicaJ and Germany. not wishing to 
10 •• the support ot Italy, or more probably, not wishing to aee Italy join 
iii th France or England, renewed the Triple Alliance in 1881. This renewal 
oontained a secret clause, proteoting Italy against any attempt by France to 
take over Italy's territory in Atrica.5 Despite thi. agreement Italy prooeeded 
~o make a treaty with France in 1900, ooncerning African expansion.6 Wheth.r 
~.rmany was aware ot this treaty is unoertain, but in 1902 the Triple 
~llianoe ft. again renewed, and it reassured Italy ot German support in 
rripolitanla and Cyrenaioa, and also contained a deolaration trom Austria-
~~ary that no opposition would be ottered to Italian measurea in thea. 
provinoes.7 
'.l'hua the Triple Alliance. contraoted in 1882 and renewed twioe betore 
902, aligned Germany, Austria-Hungary and a doubtful Italy. each one 
~romt8in, to support the others in their colonial polioy. 
, A. F. Pribram. The Secret Treaties ot Austria-Hungalb, Translated y J. G. DtAroy Paul and D. P.)(eyers, 'Ci"mbr1dge-;-IiO'ftrd Press. 21, II, 211. 
5 .!!!!., 212. 
6 Explained on page 7. 
1 Pribram. II. 213. 
6 
Suffering from her recent defeat in the Franoo-Pru88ian War, France 
luooeeded in adding Tunis and Algeria to her empire, although Italy had 
entertained the idea ot doing the aame. HoweTer, when France began plan. tor 
annexing Morooco, she wisely deoided to obtain the oonsent of the other 
interested powers. It _s at thia time that the Italian-Frenoh Treaty 
materialized. 
To understand the Italian ohange ot policy it is neoessary at this 
time to review the French relations with Russia and England. Germany teared 
the possible alliance of France and Russia, which would leave her with an 
enemy to the west and an enemy to the east. SUCh an alliance did not appear 
too probable, due to the seemingly insurmountable d1 tferenee in ~O'Vernment 
between republican France and monarchial Russia. However, to avoid any such 
danger, Bismarok joined the League ot Three Emperors in 1881.' This league 
oompe.ed ot Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, was strengthened by a 
Reinsurance Treaty shortly afterward, despite the taot that the Triple Allianoe 
bad already been tormed. In 1890 William II refused to renew this Treaty and 
as Bismarck had feared France and Russia were drawn closer together.a 
On August 27, 1891, Russia and France signed an agreement, pledging 
to consult one another over any threat to peace. 9 This statement was too 
indefinite to suit the French plans, 80 in 1893 the follOWing secret treaty 
II&S arranged: 
a A. F. Pribram, England and the International Policy 2!. ~ 
~uropean Great Powers, OXford, Olaredon ~88, 1931, 94. 
9 Pribram, Secret Treaties, II, 213. 
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If Franoe 1.. attaoked by Germany or by Italy .upported by Germany, 
Russia ahall employ all her available foroe. to attaok Germany. 
If Rusda 1s attaoked by Germany or Austria supported by Germany, Franoe 
.hall employ all her aTailable foroes to fight Germany.10 
This Dual Allianoe between Russia and Pranoe was the first step then toward 
the Triple Eatente, formed as a balanoe 01' power against the Triple Allianoe. 
It an allianoe between England and France was inconceiTable before 
. 
the Dual Alliance, it was eTen more remote now that Russia had joined with 
Franoe, her tradl tional enemy. Russia and England had also been haTing 
diffioulty in the Near East, but the diplomatic problem was further complioatee 
by the faot that England did not wish to weaken Russia too much, beoauae then 
Germany WDuld be giTen a tree hand. 
Con.equently England, isolated by her trouble. with rrance, Germany, 
and Russia, was desperately trying to align heraelf with some other power, SO 
aa not to be left alone again.t them all. One of these disputes between 
England and France deTeloped over the Fashocla affair. Finally, in 1899 an 
Anglo-Frenoh Agreement settled the trouble in Fashoda, and both countries 
marked out their spheres of interest in the Sudan. 
It is now possible to return to the treaty made between Italy and 
Franoe, aince it oame about direotly a. a result of the Anglo-Frenoh agreement, 
Italy, learning of this agreement, asked France if this would interfere with 
the Turkieh provinoe. of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, whioh the Italians wanted for 
themselve.. In order to gain the tood w111 01' Italy, Pranoe told the Italian 
10 .!!?!!., 215. 
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foreign ministe; that they had no designs on Tripoli or Cyrenaica. ll 
How, although Italy was a member ot the Triple Alliance, a further 
arrangement was made on December 16, 1900, when Italy promised not to oppose 
France in 
the exeroise and the safeguarding ot the rights which are the result for 
her of the proximity of her territory (Algeria) with that (Moroocan) 
Empire ••• it being understood that. it a moditication at the political 
or territorial status of Morocco should result theretrom, Italy could 
re.erve to herself, as a measure of reciprocity, the right event~l1Y to 
develop her intluence with regard tc Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 2 
This _s ot great importance to France, because until now Italy 
had been prepared to tight rather than let France take any more of North 
Africa. 
Baving obtained the oonsent ot Italy to go ahead in Moroceo, FraDOe 
_. nolt' prepared to deal wi. th England and Spain. 
M. Deleas •• , the French foreign minister, next appro_ched Spain, and 
promised her the northern coast ot Morooco, including Tangier and Fe., and a 
part ot the South, if France could take the reat.1S The Spanish Cabinet 
ref'used to sign the agreement, because they feared the reaction of' England. 
To approach the Bnglish was a very difficult thing to do, even thougl 
a sucoesstul agreement had been made in 1899 ccncerning the 'aahoda affair. 
\ Deleasse, however, selected a very opportune time to consult with England, 
11 W. H. Cooke and E. P. Stickney (ed.), Readings in Euro~an 
International Relations Since ~, New York, Harper & Bros.,-r931,-62. 
12 Pribram, Secret Treaties, II, 246. 
13 0:. P. Gooch, Hiatory 2! Modern Europe, New York, Henry Holt & 
Co., 1922, 341. 
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beoause Englanc!'waa having trouble with Germany over the following points: 
1) German preas reportl against Britain'lII oonduot in South Atrioa were very 
unfavorable J 2) German naval power was inoreasing steadily, and 3) Germal17' III 
Bagdad Railway Soheme was not in keeping with the Briti.h plans in the Near 
East. 
England, therefore, did not peaitate to acoept the French otfer ot 
an a11ianoe at this time, and the Entente Cordiale 'ft. signed in 1904. A tew 
yearl later, the Triple Entente wal tormed, oomposed ot Russia, France, and 
England, but first the Anglo-Russian ditfioulties had to be smoothed out. 
The deolaration of April 8, 1904, al it was made known to the 
general publio, contained the following agreements I 
1. The Government of the French Republio undertakes not to obstruct the 
aotion ot Great Britain in Egypt. 
2. The Government of the Frenoh Republio deolares that they have no 
intention of altering the politioal statue of Moroooo. 
3. Ril Britannio Majesty's Government reoogni,e. that it appertain. to 
Franae ••• to bring about the administrative, eoonomioal, finanoial and 
military retorm of which it atands in need an Moroooci1. 
4. In order to seoure the tree passage ot the Straits of Gibraltar, the 
two Government. agree not to permit the ereotion of any fortifioations. 
5. In regard to these interests the Frenoh Government will oome to aD 
understanding with the Spanish Government.14 
However, that waa not the complete arrangement made between these 
two powers, beoause in 1911 the tollowing aeoret artiole. beoame known, 
1. Whenever the Sultan oease. to exeroise authority over it (Uoroooo), 
the northern part should oome wi thin the sphere of influenoe of Spain, 
and the remaining part be lett to France. 
14 G. P. Goooh and Harold Temperly (ed.), British Documents on the 
Ori~in of the War (1898-1914), London, Hi. Majesty's Atationery Ottice,l9!7,' 
III ,S136-=!'9l. -
10 
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2. It Spain. • • .hould think proper to deoline the arrangement between 
Franoe and Great Britain would be none the less applioable. 1S 
Naturally, Spain signed the agreement, and France was now tree to proceed with 
her plans in MOroooo. 
\ On Deoember 10, 1904 Delcasse addressed the Frenoh Chamber ot 
Deputies with theae words, 
The time has oome to oonvince MOrooco that tor the sake of tranquility, 
we should aid it in establishing internal seourity and order, for our 
prosperity we should furnish capital to profit ~ the relouroes in whioh 
Morooco abounds, so that continuing to liTe itl own 11te, it. ouatoma, 
lawl and chieta being Bafer,uarded, under a Sultan whose authority will be 
strengthened and extended, Morocoo will know our power only through the 
benefit • .nioh will aooompany it.1S 
France was makillg use ot the artiole in the Anglo-French Treaty whic 
had given them the right to protect their own territories against attaoks by 
the Moroooans. Since Moroooo bordered direotly on Algeria, there were oertain 
to be raids aoross the border. International attention was too used on the 
Moroocan disorder at this time. when Ion Ferdicaris. a naturalized Amerioan 
oitizen~ 1I&S kidnapped by a Morocoan bandit, Raisuli. The Amerioan Secretary 
ct State, John Bay, dispatohed .. naval squadron to Morooco and issued a demand 
tor "Perd1caris alive or Rai.uli dead."17 Perdicaril was loon released, 
although some oredit a Frenoh diplomat tor seouring h'is re1ease. lS Thil, ot 
15 ~., 394. 
16 P. T. Moon, Imperialism ~ World Politios, New York, Maomi1lan 
el)., 1927, 199. 
17 W. F. Johnson, Amerioa'. Foreign Relationa, New York, Century Co.~ 
1916, II, 150. 
18 Moon, 201. 
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oour.e, .. brought a favorable light to the Frenoh plan at bringing order into 
Morocoo. 
Extensive Frenoh loans made to the Sultan at Morocco also added to 
the i~~nch 011.1. that they were entitled to enter Morocco at this time. In 
1900 Adb ... l-hh, just sixteen, oame to the throne and was encouraged to spend 
his money freely on various European luxuries. Unable to collect higher taxes 
from his people, he aocepted a Frenoh loan of sixty-two million francs at a 
five per cent interest on the security of sixty per cent of his customs reven~ • 
After makin" suoh a generous loan, France al8't.l1Md the privilege ot straighteni ~ 
out the interaal ohaos ot the Morocoan state. Shortly after the loan ., made 
M. Saint-Rene Talliandler was sent to Fez ~ Delca'8~ to inst1tute a program 
ot reforms. These retorm. inoluded the organization ot the militar,y polioe 
under Frenoh officers, the establishment of a state bank to brin~ about 
tinancial order, and the undertakinr, ot various public 'WOrks with Frenoh 
capital.19 
No 'Word ot d18approval was forthooming tram England, Spain, or Italy 
linoe they had been silenoed by earlier treaties promising them compensations. 
Russia also remained quiet beaause of the Dual Alliance made in 1893. Only 
Germany objeoted, sinoe she had not been assured ot oolonial galns it France 
Germ&nJ's objeotion took the tbrm ot a visit by the Kaiser to 
Tangier, after an unsuccessful appeal to President Roosevelt to call tor a 
19 ~., 202. 
conferenoe. Wh1le in Tangier, the Kaiser delivered a foroeful speeoh in 
lIhioh he deolared that "the Sultan __ lovereign and independent and ahould 
be oautious about adoptln~ the Frenoh program of reforms."20 Be further 
olaimed that "Moroooo should remain open to the oommeroe of all nations on 
equal terms.2l The Sultan was greatly impressed by the speeoh and refused 
to sign the plans, unleas they were f~rst discuased by an international oonfer 
enoe. 
\ Meanwhile, Delcalae met with the Frenoh Cabinet in June and demanded 
that France uphold it. honor, even it _r wa. neceseary. He added that 
England had promised to suppo'rt the French. 22 The French Cabinet ._ 
doubtful ot English support, and felt they could count only on Rusaia as a 
sure ally. Russia at thil time, however. _a suffering from the RU8so-Japanes~ 
War, so she, too, was of little help. Atter some discussion, the Cabinet 
, 
Toted 1n l,'aTor of a oonferenoe and De10asse resigned to be Buooeeded by 
M. Rouvier. 
Thus we have the .etting tor the famous Algeoiras Oonterenoe held 
from Januar" 16 to April 7, 1906. The United States helped sponsor this 
oonterence beoauae ot,her .'r11er participation in the Madrid Oonterence ot 
1860, which had agreed to the ·open door" of Morocco. It waa on this point 
that Germany felt the right to demand another conterenoe, since ahe too had 
been a signatory. 
20 P. W. Sl08son, Europe Since ~, Bos~on, Houghton Mifflin 00., 
1936, 263-4. 
21 ~., 264. 
22 Moon 204. 
CHAPTER II 
AMERICA! PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE PARTICIPATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 
With the opening of the Alge.iras Conferenoe public opinion in the 
United States was divided along three lines. The tirlt and most controversial 
topio oonoerned whether or not the United Statea had the right to take an 
active part in tAe problem. Both Republican and Democratic Senators voiced 
their opinionl publicly, and ~.paper and magazine editors quiokly lined up 
tor or against our partioipation. 
One ot the firat objections to President Roosevelt's whole-hearted 
btcking of the conterenoe wal based on the argument that suoh an action would 
be oontrary ",,0 our )(onroe Dootrine. AI might be expeoted moat ot the objeotioll ~ 
came trom the Democrats, who tollowed the leadership ot Senator Augustu8 
Baoon of the Demoorats. Senator Baoon pointed out in hia argument that. 
Our oommeroial interests are not involved in the prooeedings ot the 
oonference, sinoe they are safeguarded by the Madrid Conferenoe, and the 
-Algectraa Conference disavows the intention of reViling them. l 
If then our commercial intereatl were not involved, the United 
State. would not be justified in entering the conterence, lince that was one 
1 "U. S. and the Moroocan Conterence," Harper's Weekly, New York, 
January 27, 1906, 112. 
13 
14 
'" of the main reasons for our interest 1n it. Senator Baoon then prooeeded to 
explain that the real proble.s to bedisculsed were political, beoause, 
Germany ftS asking tor permission to exeroiae the temporary oontrol ot 
the orown domains, whioh were given a8 seourity for the loan of two 
million dollars, made by German bankers to the Sultan 01' Morocoo. Thia 
is poU tioal beoause so otten this temporary oontrol becomes permanent. • .. 
Anot~s:' question to be handled involves the problem of whether or not the 
maintenanae of order in the Sultanta dominion. should be entrusted to 
'rance or to international interetts.' 
The •• above mentioned problema, claimed Senator Baoon, oould only be 
judged as politioal question8 and it would then be contrary to the Monroe 
Dootrine for the United S+.ate8 to beoome involved in such an affair. Be 
further added that the only pos8ible excuse tor United States repres.ntation 
would be aome inoident similar to the Perdicarie affairt and sinoe no suoh 
eTent had ooourred we should not beoome involved, becau8e" "11> i8 the UD.'varyiD.f] 
policy of our government to oross such bridges when we oome to them." 
Suoh arguments coming trom a Democratio Senator might not have 
oarried muoh wight, but much to the surprise of all, Senator Eugene Hale, the 
leader 01' the Republioan _jority, agreed with him. Senator Hale stated that 
he ..... s afraid the President would lead us into an entangling allianoe and 
would set a precedent in our foreign policy."! He further claimed, however, 
"that our delegate~ would be reoalled in case a vote was demanded against one 
country or the other."4 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
D 
15 
.. 
'rom. the Republiou group oame an lIaedie:t;e an .... r througb it. 
spokellll&l1, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. A8 a m_ber of the Foreip Utair. 
Committee, he attempted to refute the Demooratl' agrumen1l. that it the Uni1led 
State. repre.el1tativ •• attendAMl thl. conteren .. it would be a 411regard of 
the principle. 1&14 down by the MolU"Oe Dootrine. He went still turther to 
explain .... y any objeotiou which might arl.e oon_ming Washlngtion'. warning 
against W8Dtangling allianoe •• -
In refuting the tirat argument· he old, 
The Jlonroe Deetrlne 1. not be1ng v10lated, s1noe we are not •• eldng 
terr1tory or entering into al11anoe. wMoh m1gbt lavol.,.. u. in war. 
Franoe and Ge1WU1Y are both our tr1endl. 1'Ie are merely trying to avoid 
war between th .... 8 
fhen 11noe lome objeotion. had been voioed conoerning the 
poldbil1ty 01' the United State. beooming involved in wan entangling all:1anoe-
nth one or more European oountries, Senator LOdge went on to di.cuss thi •• 
Would 1t be absolutely wise to adhere to Washington's warning wh10h _s 
expre.sed :lmJaediately atter our di8&greement with Franoe oonoern1ng the 
treaty of allianoe? J'urthe1"B)re, this warning doe. not in the least 
«Eolude, and neYer hal been held to exolude, the United State. from 
agre_ent. with one or more European power. u to matters at1'eet1ng trade 
and oo .. roe, or trOll internat10nal oonvrtiOl'1s, whioh are entered into 
from the pr01lOtlon ot the world'. peaoe. 
A. is quite md811t trOll. the foregoing statement. one ot the main 
41ft10u1t1 •• was to determine whether or not the United &bate. wa. pr1aarily 
oonoerned over tiM. conterence because ot ittl oommercial or polltioal interest • 
6 H. C. Lodge, "JIonroe Doctrine and lIorooco," !!!!"per' I Week1l, 
1_ York, L, llaroh 10, 1906, 332. 
e Ibid., 333. 
-
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It oommercial intereats were endangered, many telt we would not be violating 
the principles ot the Vonroe Dootrine, while on the other hand, it our main 
concern was for the political aituation in Morocco, then we would be breaking 
a principle tor which we had tought tor over seventy-tive years. 
As an example ot the Amerioan attitude oonoerning this question, 
Outlook Itated that "our interests are, commercial not political. ft7 This 
ltatement was baaed on the Treaty ot Madrid made- in 1880 which provided tor 
an "open-door" in Morooco tor all powers signing thia treaty, and which we now 
law as being endangered due to the French-German contrcver.,y over Morocco. 
Thil opinion was agreed to by most of the Republicans and was upheld al we 
have seen by Senator Lodge. 
However popular this argument waa in our country, the otfioial trade 
figures of Morocoo in 1904 abow that total United States trade with Morooco 
amounted to only .'00,000, compared with .2,500 ,000 for Germany, $4,000,000 
for France and $8,600,000 tor England. Thele tigurel alone would leem to 
deny the tact that the United States would teel very aeriously the threat of 
the p088ible 1088 at Morocco's trade. 8 
To counteraot the Republican ltatement, the Democrats pointed to the 
statement made by England which detinitely attempted to put the United Statel 
on the spot al violating the Monroe Dootrine by her politioal intervention in 
~roooo. Sydney Brookl attacked Senator Lodge tor declaring the interest of 
7 wU. S. and the Morocoan Conference," Outlook, LXXXII, January 27, 
1906, 144-146. 
8 "france and Her rore ign Re lat i ona ," Review 2!. Reviewl, XXXI II , 
~rch, 1906, 270. 
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the United States to be oOlllllleroial by saying that, "it [United States1 is 
sitting at and voting at a conferenoe on a question that ia predominently, 
if not exolusively, a European question."9 'fo substantiate his opinion that 
the United State. waa inoonsistent in upholding the Monroe Dootrine, Brook. 
referred to the prevailing aituationl in Venezuela and MOrocoo with thes. 
wordll 
Against Vene.uela France haa oomplaintl whioh the world i. at one in 
regarding a. well founded. A, valuable ooncession granted to her 
oiti&ena haa been frivoloualy oanoelled. Her mini.ter has been treated 
'With studied and oontemptuoul indignity. But before exaoting reparatione 
tor these and other injurie. Franoe mu.t aeek the aanotion of the United 
States. She is informed that under no oiroumstanoes will .he be permittee 
to oocupy permanently a single inch ot Venezuelan territory. Eyen a 
temporary occupation exposes her at once to the animo.ity and 8uspicion 
of Amerioan opinion. IO 
After thus showing how the United Statea interpreted and applied the 
Monroe Dootrine to mattera relating to the Western Hemisphere, he then stated 
that "the oontrast between the liberty the United States enjoys in Morocoo 
and Europe and the restriotions she obUgea Europe to contorm to in South 
Amerioa, makes lomething of an international anomoly." Be further added "the 
United State. bas neither a oommercial nor politioal interest in Morooco."ll 
Several other important question. were brought forth by Brooks in 
this article, whioh strongly oondemned the Amerioan position and strengthened 
the Democratio argument to withdraw our repre.entative.. Be as.erted that. 
9 Sydney Brooks, "U. S. at A,lgeoiral trom an Englilh Standpoint,· 
Harper'. Weekll' L, )(aroh 24,1906,402. 
10 ~., 403. 
11 Ibid. 
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1) Roose.elt bad raised the question ot better treatment tor the Jews 
in Morocoo, whioh England teels would certainly not be disoussed 
exoept tor Roo.e.elt's initiative. 
2) Roose .. lt raised a question ot an international system ot policy 
whioh England olaims is a oommitment ot Amerioa' 8 aiding with Germany. 
3) Amerioa will probably not assume the slighteat responsibility tor 
carrying out the reoommendations ot the oonterence and admits us 
liable tor the results ot whate.er deoidon is reaohed. There{jre, 
the oonterenoes oannot atteot her politically or oommercially. 
In dealing with the tirst ot. these statements it 11 necessary to 
review the conditions existing among the Jews in Morocco. For many years the 
Je~ had been treated badly in Morocoo being torced to wear the gabardine and 
to go baretoot in the streets. The law even restricted them trom living in 
two-story houses. Bowe.er, little heed was paid to this situation until 
international attention was tooused on it due to an inoident whioh oocurred in 
the early twentieth oentury. There are two versions to the inoident; the 
first wa_ that ot the French government, whioh read, "A respectable Jew, 
aged seventy, who wa. a French 01 then trOll'!. Algiers, 118.. attaoked by a mob 
at Fez, drenohed with kerosene and burned alive."l! 
Naturally the French newspapers played up the story dramatically, 
uling it 1n the hope ot arousing the world's attention to the need ot some 
organized toroe (namely Frenoh) ~ich would bring law and order to Morooco. 
!he Morocoan government immediately presented its side ot the story by stating 
that "the Jew was not aged, respectable nor a French cithen. Be was 
justitiably shot tcr insulting a Moorl.h woman on the street."l' 
-
12 Ibid. 
13 "Bow we got into it,· Independent, LX, January 11, 1906, 118. 
14 ..!!!!!., 119. 
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Despite the refutation of the Frenoh story by the Morocoan government 
the United States Consul at Tangier prote,ted and demanded punishment for 
Itho.e guilty. He further warned the Sultan: 
It i8 undi8putably requisite that the Israelite. of Moroooo should be 
proteoted by the looal authorities, otherwise, it will not be long 
betore they will be proteoted by toreign nations.15 
I'hi8 inoident, no doubt, was what Sidney Brooks was reterrint; to 1n hie 
~rtiole, when he olaimed that Roosevelt had raised the Jewish problem whioh 
rould otherwise not have been raised it Roosevelt had not done so. 
!he seoond aocusation made by Brooks, olaiming that the United States 
py her suggestions ot an international system of policy made a commitment ot 
Unerica, elding 111 th Germany, will be disoussed later in a more detailed 
~nner, although it did not seem to be strongly substantiated by the American 
ublio. 
When Brooks stated that Amerioa would probably not assume the 
lightest responsibility for carrying out the reoommendations of the conterence 
~d admitted no liability tor the results ot whatever deoision was reaohed, 
~ raised a question whioh had been voioed many times by the people of Amerioa. 
he Un! ted States in entering this oonterence could in the eyes ot many be 
laoing itselt in quite a ditfioult position, beoause it it came to a deoision, 
b. United States might be toroed to side either wi th Germa.~ or France. In 
uoh a ea.e we would have loat a trielld sinoe we were presU'ID&bly entering the 
e ollterence as a friend of both oountries. 
Thi, question was brought to the attention ot the publio in an 
15 Ibid. 
--
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article attempting to explain away argument. made by Senator Bacon.16 The 
problem wal stated a8 tollows, "Bow oan the United Stat •• assilt except by 
voting tor one sid. or the other in whioh event they are sure to ottend a 
nation with whioh the American government il on triendly term.?" The answer 
given by this writer tollowed the opinion ot most ot the men olole to the 
President, tor he said, "It our delegate. are oalled on to vote in a _y to 
grieve el ther Franoe or Germany, the Seoretary ot State oan instruot them to 
wi thdraw trom the conterence." .As we have 8een, Senator Bale agreed with 
thil theory, although he had lided with Senator Bacon on the other issue •• 
Senator Spooner a180 entered into this debate by stronrly objecting 
to the stand taken by Senator Bacon. In answering the Republican Senator, 
he said that "the men (dele,atel) were not to vote, but merely lilten, and 
discU.I, if they desired."l7 But his chiet ditterenoe with Senator Bacon 
arose conoerning whether or not dilculsion should be oarried on in open or 
closed le8sion. Be wal in tavor of a cloled .ellion, while Senator Bacon 
olaimed, "no torei,n government should be ottended, nor _s any Ili,ht intended 
to the President. ,,18 However, the Senate voted not to have an open 
discussion of the problem. the following day Senator Bacon repeated a 
request made previously "that the President present a report on whatever 
instructionl were given to our delegatel sinoe the Pre.ident'. entire polioy 
16 "U. S. and the Moroccan Conterenoe," Outlook, UXXII t January 27, 
1906, 146. 
17 lew York T1mel, January 10 .. 1906. 
18 Ibid. 
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... both in Europe and South and Central America, has seriously alarmed Senator. 
on both .1de •• - 19 
An editorial on the .ame day reintoroed Senator Spooner's statement 
that our representatives were to listen and discuss, but not vote, unl.s, they 
tirst oontacted their home government. 
the question then aroae as tp why the United Statel should becozr.e 
involved in the oonterenoe at all, it they intended to ~thdraw should their 
decision prove embarrassing to the United States. Several theories were 
presented along thh line, most important ot which wa. that there seemed to be 
a detinite threat ot war existing between Germany and France, it some solution 
wal not reached conoerning their interests in Morooco. The United State8, 
having showed their power a. arbitrator reoently in Venezuela and in the Russo-
Japanese War, _y ha.,.e telt the oall to otter their servioe. again. .Aa 
Senator Lodge law it, France and Germany were both our friends, we were merely 
trying to avoid war between them. 
Although the question was debatable whether a war mirht deTelop 
beoause ot this trouble, Mr. Root claimed that "there are strained relations 
between Franoe and Germany. and it is supposed that a oasus bell~ -.y be 
found there. ft20 This opinion was oontradictory to the optimistio statement 
made by the .!!! !.2!:! Times a week earlier that neither London nol' the United 
States expeoted war,21 despite the taot that their newspaper had said on the 
19 .!!?!!., January 9, 1906. 
20 ~., January 19, 1906. 
21 Ibld~, January 7, 1906. 
-
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previous day, tnat J 
Ambassador White and Minister Gummere have gone to the conference with 
two objeots--the maintenanoe of the open-door in Morooco, and the 
exeroise ot good offioes by this oountry in the oonferenoe to smooth 
away asperities and prevent the development of friotion that jeopardizes 
world peaoe.22 
Sinoe it 18 impossible to know whether war would have resulted had 
the United States tailed to join the opnferenoe, we oan merely oonclude that 
there ..... a di tferenoe ot opinion on the subjeot. That many ot the Amerioan 
people telt oonfident in the judgment of President Roosevelt i. evident from 
the to 11 owing ata tement: 
Wi th Senator Spooner, mo at Amerioana, 118 think, believe that the Predden' 
ot the United Statee, who hit upon the p.yohologloal moment to intervene 
and bring to an end the deplorable war between Rueda and Japan, oan be 
trusted to determine the payohologloal moment when our ambassadors must 
withdraw trom the Morooean Conterenoe in order to eave this oountry from 
all danger ot2gntortunate European entanglements, should suoh a moment oome to pass. 
Amother view on the importanoe of the United States' partioipation 
was pre.ented in the same artiole, when the author oontinued, "Furthermore, 
though it 11 not generally known, two ot the Great Powers deolined to be 
represented unless all the signatories to the existin~ Moroocan Treaty took 
part. " It suoh _s the oase, the oonterenoe might not have been held without 
the pr.senoe ot the United States- representatives. 
It is quite evident that aa a result ot the seoret treaties 
negotiated by the European oountries during the years preoeding the oonterenoe~ 
22 ~., January 6, 1906. 
23 nU. S. and the Moroooan Conterenoe," Outlook, LXXXII, February 3 
1906, 244. 
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all the Bir; Powers had lined up, even betore the oonference oonvened, elther 
tor France or Germany. !he Un! ted State. could then perform a valuable 
senioe to Bueh a meeting by arriving a. an apartial member. This position, 
of oourse, a. olaimed by the United States on .e"f'era1 oooaslons. 
On Janua17 4, 1906 the !!! ~ Tl.s 8&ld, 
Mes8r •• WhIte and Gummere, the _rloan deleptes w111 go into the 
oonterenoe ab.olutely unoOlllll1tted to elther the FreDOb or the Gem&Jl 
contentions. The gG"f'ermaent'. vle .. 18 that Amerioa bas by "f'irtue of her 
anoient inter.st in Moroooo, nfpts even superior to tho.e ot any 
European Itate in deoiding tbe or1tioal que.tion. whioh will oome betore 
the oonterence ••• Amerioa stands unoommitted elther to tbe German 
propoSitlon, the oreation of an international poltlt toroe, or the Frenoh 
plan of employing Algerian polioe for the purpose. 
Three daY8 later the ed1tor of the New York Times ap.in l"epeated the. 
---..---
the United States would remain impartial. 
Th. anoient rights ot Amerioa referred to in the pre"f'ious artiole 
were explained by the author in thIs .y. 
1'he bad. ot thiB "f'1 .. 11 that Amerioa, ainglebanded, made _r upon the 
Barbary Stat.s, wiped out piracy in the Medlterranean -tera, and 
oonoluded the tirst treaty between &nJ oivi11zed Dation and tho •• States, 
a treaty mioh au tormed the bash of the demand ot 8"f'ery other nation 
tor favored natlon treatment at the hand. of Morooco ••• The UD1ted 
Statee teel. it has the rIght and duty to partioipate in this oODferenoe.= 5 
'.1'he United state. -. then olabling righte to partioipate 1n the 
Algeolraa Conterenoe, beoause one hundred and nineteen years ago they had mad e 
their tirat treaty ~th Moroooo. They tollowed this treaty with another ODe 
in 1863, and then in 1886, Amerioa with eleven other coUlltri •• had _t at 
24 We. York Tl ... , January 4, 1906. 
----
25 Ibid. 
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Jfadrid, where a third treaty was signed. This latter treaty had remained as· 
the standrad for dealing with Morocco, until the recent olash between French 
and German interests. 
Not all Americans felt, however, that this was a sound reason for 
the United States to intervene in the affairs of Morocco. One opponent 
stated: 
The fantastic explanation from washington, that our historic bombardment 
of the Barbary pirates entitle. WI to a plaoe in the conferenoe, can 
hardly be reoeived with gravity by Buro~an diplomat., however, good 
their oontrol of their faoial mU801ea. 2 
Taking into aocount then the many reasons advanoed by the United 
States for their active partioipation in the matter, it oan be assumed that 
reoognition might have been given to her ancient rights in Morocco and to her 
oommeroial interests. Furthermore, some oonsideration might be forthooming 
beoause of Roosevelt's successtul role as arbitrator in several incidents just 
prior to this orisis in Morocco, but undoubtedly, the strongest olaim held by 
the United States was the urgent request by' Germany and the seeming desire of 
It 
France to have the United States help them settle their problems without 
reoourse to war. This last reason will be emphasized in a later ohapter, 
dealing with the offioial oorrespondenoe between the irench and German 
.inisters and President Roo.evelt. 
A. to the Amerioan assertion that they were attending the oonference 
unoommitted to either the Frenoh or German interests, and were viewing the 
26 "Morocco Conference at Algeoiras," Nation, LXXXII, January 11, 
1906, 30 • 
.... 
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situation trom a oompletely impartial position--that is open to oriticism. 
Certainly, our ottioial papera, whioh were not made pubUo at the tll1Wt, but 
whioh later presented ua with the true pioture at Amerioan intereats, leaves a 
question in our minds as to just how impartial the United States wal. 
With 80 many argument8 being debated during the months preoeding the 
Conterenoe, it might be expeoted that Amerioan interest might lag. however, 
with the departure ot the Amerioan delegates to Algeoira8 the intere8t of the 
Amerioan publio was re-awakened to the approaohing Conterenoe. Spain, who 
was to aot as hoat to the representatives ot the partioipating oountries also 
reoognized the importanoe at the Conterenoe and the following deaoription 
reaohed the Amerioan newspapers from Algeoiras. 
This quaint old town ie gradually awakening aa the day tor the opening ot 
the Conterenoe on Moroooan reform approaohea, and the usual Spanish 
lethargy haa given plaoe to a burst ot animation and excitement. All 
publio buildings and bridges are resplendent with orim80n deoorations and 
tape.trles~ ~ • the gathering ot many warship. add. a touoh ot 
piotureaquen.s, and aignitioanoe to the 8oene. 27 
Although there __ a ~eneral opttmistio feeling that a satisfaotory 
arrangement oould be made oonoerning the problem in Moroooo, Senator Hale, who 
had earlier expreased hh disapproval ot sending Amerioan delegates to the 
Conterenoe, again emphasized this by saying' 
The dan~er i8 not trom the President or the Seoretary ot State, 
the asoendanoe and promise of the war'spirit in the oountry ••• 
be much better it we oould keep our hands otf. But we shall get 
this without being enta.ngled.28 
27 !!! York Timel, January 13, 1906. 
28 .!!!!., January 17, 1906. 
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It was a distinguished group of delegates who assembled on January 
16, 1906 to open the Conferenoe. The senior delegates from the various 
oountri •• were; M. R.voil of Franoe, who waa the ex-gavernor of AlgiersJ 
Herr von Radowitz of Germany; Henry White of the United States, Marquia 
Visoonti Venosta of Italy. Count Caasini of RUlsia, Who was the Ambassador to 
Spain; Sir Arthur lioolson, who -.. the Ambassador to Russia; Mohammed el 
Torres of Moroooo) and the Duke of Almodovar of Spain, who was ohosen Preslden~ 
of the Conferenee. 29 
An intere.ting episode ooourred just prior to the opening of the 
Conferenoe, whioh involved Mohammed 81 Torres. The MOroooan delegate no 
doubt _s annoyed by the repeated statements olaiming that i'oreign help _8 
needed to put down disorder in Morocoo, and so he responded to one such 
remark, "Why don't they hold a Conference upon Russia and establish order 
there'"SO 
As the minor questions were settled first by the delegates, the 
Amerioans began to show leas interest in the Conferenoe, but when the importan1 
questions of oontrol of the bank and polioe were brought before the delegates 
the publio again eagerly followed the news from Algeoira •• 
One interesting item of news came to the attention of the Amerioan 
public, shortly after the arrival of the delegates from the United States. 
While both Henry White and Samuel Gummere told of the great wealth in Moroooo, 
Mr. Gumm.ere went on the explain, "Inve.tors there /J.oroooiJ think: they are 
29 .!!?!!., April 1, 1906. 
30 Ibid., January 18, 1906. 
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losing money If"theY' do not make from 30 to 40 per oent, while 80 to 100 per 
oent ia not rare.-31 
Aa the que8tionlS ot greater importanoe arolSe during the Conferenoe 
the United States beoame a~re ot its powerful position at the Conterenoe. 
Before analyzing the offioial communioations whioh made this Conferenoe 
pos~1ble, we will oonsider aome of the,public opinions, expressed in America, 
during the Conterence, oonoerning the major problems to be disoussed. 
!51 ~., January 22, 1906. 
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CHAPTER III 
AMERICAN PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FRENCH 
AND GERMAN CLAIMS TO MOROCCO 
As was stated in the preoed:1.ng ohapter, the United States 
repeatedly claimed l that they were impartial in their attitude toward the 
trouble in Vorocoo, but telt that sinoe they did not intend to gain materially 
trom the oonterenoe, they could render a valuable service by their presenoe. 
However, Allan Nevins probably worded it more correctly When he sald, RThe 
United States ia not wholly impartial, but oertainly disinterested and 
unseltish.-l 
France was basing her olaim to inter terence in Moroooo on her 
predominant interest in northern Atrioa. 1'hia interest was developed by the 
taot that Franoe controlled Algeria, which adjoined Moroooo. Sinoe there -s 
1& danger ot ,raids over the border of these two oountries, France felt the need 
ot lome strong power Whioh ~uld bring order into this region. Because France 
~s geographioally closer than any other interested country, she was sugresting 
~olice contrcl by the Frenoh. Spain, who possibly might allo claim a speoial 
~nterest in Moroooo, beoause she taces Morooco across the Mediterranean Sea 
1 Allan Nevins, ~White: Thir~ Years 2.! American Diplomaol, ~ew York, Harper Bros., 193~. 
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. on the North, had agreed with Franoe in a seoret treaty to allow Franoe to 
penetrate into mOlt of Morooco, reoeiving only a small seotion for herself. 
Typioal of the United States' attitude toward this olaim of Morocco 
was ibis statemente 
the fact that there is a long 'boundary line between Algeria, a Frenoh 
poelessi on, and Morocoo, naturally gives to France under any oircumltanoe. 
a Ipecial interelt in whatever takes place acroa. the trontier.2 
Another article confirmed this by laying, "Beyond all q1.8ltion 
France has;predominant intereats in Morocco, due to her adjoining Algerial 
3 pOIsea8ion~" 
Oe~ny refused to aooept this clatm by Franoe, logioally etatings 
Ju.tbeoauae one nation hal predominant interests do.s not follow that 
ahe has predominant right. of interterenoe ••• It predominant intereat. 
allow for predominant rights of interferenoe, why shouldn't Germany take 
the Wetherlandl? 
It would not be suffioient reason for France to take over Morocoo 
just becaule it bordered on Algeria, but the grave danger oame trom att~cks bf 
Moroooan rebels aoros. the border. Aa the Sultan'l money began to decline, 
rebellion soon broke out in Morocco and quiokly apread to the border. Franoe 
took advantage of the trouble to point out that the Sultan was unable to keep 
order in his country, and that some other nation, namely Franoe, should 
undertake control of the polioe. 
2 ")(orocco Conterenoe at Algeofras, tt Outlook, LXXXII I January 20, 
1906, 30. 
3 "Trouble at Algeciras," Independent, LX, March 8, 1906, 581. 
4 ~., 582 • 
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At least one Ame~ioan writer objeoted strongly to suoh a plan aa 
suggested by Franoe. Arthur Sohneider, who had spent some time in Moroooo, 
desoribed this situation. Most of the big European oountries had obtained 
speoial privileges for themselves by enoouraging young Mula Abd-el-Aziz to buy 
their manutaotured goods. When his money began to dwindle, they would loan him 
Imoney and in this way inorease' their privileges. However, word soon reaohed 
the natives that the Sultan was overly extravagant and uprisings ooourred. 
Most generous with its loans waa France, wh~ tar exceeded the other countries 
in thetr investments, and obviously in its privileges. Mr. Schneider unfolded 
imore of the story when he stated, "the rebellion began, and could have been 
put down easily, it it had not been foatered by the French, who immediately 
~egotiated another loan with the Sultan. ltS 
That France was taking advantag~ ot the rebellion to inorease her 
special position in Morocco, and to draw attention to the disorder in the 
~ountry is quite obvious trom another observation made by Mr. Schneider. 
"While this rebellion was going on the European papers made a terrifio new. ot 
~t.n Nevertheless, the author, who was at the soene of the disorder, said, 
~Actually I, as an eyewitness, law nothing but slight skirmishea."e 
Even giving France the benefit of the doubt, that great disorder did 
itx1st in Morocoo, and that danger was probable to Algeria, Germany still telt 
~hat it was not the task ot Franoe to undertake polioe control. In the opinion 
S "Truth About Morooco, " Harper's Weeklz, New York, L, February 10, 
~90e, 187. 
(; !!?!!., 188. 
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of the Germans it was up to all the countries to control a troublesome nation, 
Amerioa did not agree with the solution of Germany, nor did they 
wholeheartedly accept the French plan, although they definitely considered 
the French proposal more acoeptable than the German. An article published by 
Mr. Talliohet, the Editor-in-Chie! of the Swiss Review and a recognized authorit.y 
in Europe, was highly oommended by Amerioan reviews as oontaining a possible 
solution. Mr. Talliohet wrotel 
If any oountry is to intervene in order to put down rebellion in Moroooo, 
it should be only one oountry, the one hearest and most interested in the 
maintenance of order, sinoe saorifioes will be neoessary for the purpose. 
France is clearly the power that fulfills'all the conditions. Germany 
is too fars does not have proper equipment to carry out the job, and 
would be placed in too olose a oontact with Algeria.' 
Although these oomments seemed to assure the Frenoh of getting oontrc~ 
of the polioe foroe, sinoe they fulfilled the neoessary requirements, the 
United States and several other big powers withheld their approval. The 
,trongeat objeotion to .uoh a plan was based on the suspioion that perhap. 
Frenoh oontrol of Morooco would not necessarily mean better oonditions for 
the inhabitant.. Thi. question, raised by a few far-sighted individuals in 
the United States. was allO mentioned by Mr. Tallichet. Deapite the faot that 
he favored having the French in oontrol of the polioe, rather than a foroe of 
all the interested nations, he laid of France. 
Her tormer treatment of other oolonte. has been unoomplimentary exoept in 
Algeria and Tunis, where many ~provement8 have been made. But outside 
, E. Tallichet, ~oroooo Situation," Independent, LX, Maroh 29, 
1906, 726. 
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of Algeria and Tun!s, her exploitation of the natives, 1s admitted even 
by France, herself. 8 
This latter reference no doubt concerns her colonial policy in 
Indo-China, French Congo and Madagascar. It could be expeoted then that 
objection to the French proposal would be forthooming from Germany, but such 
~. not the case. Mr. Tallichet explains that the other countries have not 
~sed this argument, because they, including Germany, have been doing the same 
~hing. 
Of oourse not everybody felt that the French treatment of her 
polonies was unfavorable, for another writer stated, "In her oolonies, France 
9 8 to be conrratulated upon her great work for civilization." 
But whether the United States was rejecting the French plan for the 
~bove reason, or for some other reason, it oan be assumed that the former 
Wrench attitude to her oolonies was not an argument in their favor at this 
In addition to requesting control of the polioe foroe in Morooco, 
Franoe was also maintaining that it would be her right to assume oontrol of the 
~nk of Moroooo, 81noe she had invested more money than any other oountry in 
.orocoo to keep the Sultan from beooming bankrupt. Furthermore, they claimed 
~hat French trade with Morooco was ~reater than that of any other nation. 
Germany objected to this Frenoh trade with Morocoo strongly, stating 
hat although their oommercial interests at this time were not oomparable to 
8 ~ •• 728. 
9 "France and Her Foreign Relations," Review!!! Reviews, XXXIII, 270 
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~hose of France,~ they were nevertheless growing. It was Germany' 8 8uggestion, 
then, that an international control be established in Morocco, whioh would 
assure all the interested powers of a fair treatment. Again Mr. Tallichet in 
hi. artiole of March, 1906, commented on the situation by saying, "No country 
has less interest in Morocco than Germany. Its oommeroial interests are of 
10 little importance, although Germany ia ~iming at increasing them." 
Germany _8 not claiming that she had the greatest oommercial 
interest in Morooco as wal FranceJ but Ihe wal claiming the right to increase 
her trade, if possible, and this she believed could be done only if the Bank 
of Morocoo was controlled by an international torce. It 1& only natural that 
Germany's dealings with Moroooo would be muoh 1esa than those of France, ainoe 
~rmany had not entered the imperialistic field until much later than France 
and Great Britain, because the unifioation of her country was not completed 
until late ~n the nineteenth century. 
Aa to the French claim that their commerioal interests exceeded 
those of any other country, we oan only reter again to the otficial trade 
firures ot 1904, whioh show that England's trade with Morooco more than 
doubled that of Franoe. ll However, France may have been includin, in her 
e8t~atel her heavy loans to the Sultan. 
When the Germani approached President Roosevelt with the suggestion 
ot calling a oonterenoe to settle the problem ot Moroooo, they presented their 
trump oard in basing their right to such a oonterence on a previous agreement 
10 Talliohet, "Morooco Situation," Independent, LX, 816. 
270. .-- 11 ..... "Fr~oe and Her Foreign Relations, 11 Review of Reviews, XXXIII, 
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reaohed at the Madrid Convention 1n 1880. Throu,hout the trying month. preoed! g 
the conferenoe and 1n the early days ot the conterence, Germany instated over 
and over, that her only interest in oalling thl1 _Elting 11&. to uphold the 
agreement. made at Madrid over twent,y year. ago. Aooordinr, to the Germana 
the international prinoiplea involved were tar more important than the 
reoop! tlon of any oountry" predomll'1&I).t intereata. 
Germany pointed out that one ot tha ob.uees of the ).{adrld Convention 
guaranteed to eaoh ot the signatorie. the treatment ot the Mmoat-tavored nation • 
In explaining the Emperor's aims, Baron von Sternburg, the aerman miniater to 
the Un! ted Statea nid. 
Germany" poltoy baa been and 18 to preeerve the atatua quo. fhia mark. 
the difterent linel which Franoe and Germa~ are 10110win, at Algeoiral, 
tbe one tending to guard the signatory powel"l ot the Treaty ot Kadrld and 
the open door 111 trade, the other to turn Yoroooo into a Frenob 
protectorate ••• franoe ola1ml a preterential pOlition beoauae of the 
length ot her Allenan trontier and beoause ot her preponderant 1n'terelt 
in Morocco' I previoue loanl' but Germany 01alm8 that peace should not be 
bou~ht at the saoritice ot an internatl.onal prinoiple. • • Therefore, 
OermaQy ia merely working to plaoe jhe two vital que.tiona--polioe and 
bank--under international oontrol.1 
In inalat1ng that France was attempting to eatabllah a Frenoh 
proteotorate in Moroooo, Germany •• directly attaoklDt the Anglo-Frenoh 
iAgreement ot 1904, in which Great Britain recognhed that France amuleS pre.e" 
order and provide 1\.a1.atanoe tor the purpo.e of all admil11atrat1ve, eoonomic, 
finanoial, and military retonns in Moroooo. Aa tar al Great Britain •• 
oonoerned, Franoe .s to have a free hand in Horoooo and in return, France •• 
12 "Baron von Sternburg on Morocco," Outlook, LIXXII, March 11. 
1906, 585. 
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11'111111& to let Great Britain have a tree hand in Eyypt. 
The opinion of the United State. relative to th1a I1tuation _s not 
too widely publioi,ed, although Hlu"R,Or t • W.eklz did voice it. opinion on the 
Anglo-Frenoh treaty in thea. words. "The Antlo-French Agreement it 
lnoonsiatent with this treaty ~drl~ , ~oauae it would undoubtedly lead to 
a French proteotorate. ,,13 Evidently, then, other. bee1de. Germany were 
reoognbint the pos.ible danger. Although not too much publicity •• given to 
the United State.- attitude, behind the aoen •• at the oonterenoe their 
delegate. were working to uphold the international prinoiple. ot the Madrid 
Treaty. In the word. of BarOll von Sternbur,: 
The Conferenoe a. a whole reoop;nised, thia .ek, the special intereet. 
ct France, but by ind.tin,; on the open door prevent. her from repeating 
the oommeroial polioy ahe pursued in Tunia and Madagasoar.14 
France pre.ented another argument whioh she telt would seoure any 
attempt she might make to gain oontrol of Moroooo. Thi. ne. statement said 
that the Uoroooan government and the nativeS liked the Frenoh and would not 
cppo.e an intervention by them. Germany did not heaita'te to deny the .tatement ~ 
and -..nt turther to deolar. that the Vorocoana would preteI' German interventlotl ~ 
The Amerioan pre •• a"reed with Germany by saying. 
The Moor. at pre.ent d18l1l,e the French mo.t, sinoe the French by the 
Anglo-French agreement are tr.e to oarry out their plan ot pacifio 
penetration. Thi, polioy oan be oarried out only with the oon.ent of the 
13 "Gravity or the Moroooo Inoident,· Baretr-. Weekllt New York. 
XLII, July 8, 1905, 969. 
14 "Baron von Sternburg on Moroooo," Outlook, LXXXII, 586. 
.., 
Moors, and ttt.y are determined to do e ..... ryth1D@: in their pO_I" to re.18t 
it.15 
This belief il further lubstantiated in another artiole Whioh 
reters to the famous Tangier 1noident to prove the 8.r",*8nt that the German. 
and not the French are oons1dered to be the friend8 of the Moors. fhi. 
artiole explains: 
Another impression whioh .eems to prevail in Amerloa, and is oonstantly 
.xploited 1n the newapepers, 1s that the Moors take kindly to the Frenoh. 
lloth1ne oould be farther from the truth. In taot they taTor the Germans. 
When pushed to ttt. _11 by FrallOo, he [the Sultan] lmplored help ot 
Germany. 
The Kai.er then paid hi. vl.1t at Tangler. The Tls1t oreated the most 
lnwn •• exoltement I have 'ever wltnes.ed in Moroooo. Wall, and 
buildings were I18wly white.shed, triumphal arohe. _re bunt and the 
KiheI" adftnoed in great pomp and oeremony to the deep _11 ot the Royal 
Moorhh band.1S 
Thie eyewi tne.. aooount 'WOuld .e .. to deny any atatement. made by 
the Frenoh that the Oermana were not liked by the Moroooans, but France 
oontinued in 1 ts propaganda, hopine that the re.t of the 'WOrld would agr.e 
with her. 
Referring onoe again to the statement made that "The United State. 
18 not wholly impartial, but oertainly dla1ntereated and un.elfish, It it has 
been proven that we did not .how partiality to either the French or German 
argument. on all pointe. Publio opinion varied toward the two interested 
powers aa eaoh 01a1m .a pre.ented. 'l'.'he Amerioan. were alm08t Ul'Ulnimou8 in 
15 Phillip Fran01a Bayard, "Condltion. at Government in Moroooo,. 
North Amerioan ReTlew, Cl..XXX, February, 1905, 283. 
16 "Gravity of the Morocoo Inoident,· Harper'. Weekly, New York, ~LIX. 969. 
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agreeing that France had predominant ri"hts in Morocco, beoau •• 01' its neames. 
to 'tunia and Algeria, but they were equally will1J:l1 to admit the Geran rights 
to upholding the international principle. established by the Madrid 'treaty 1D 
1880. Apin they were divided in their sympathy toward Franoe and Germany on 
such important mattere as, whether 'rance be gi"en oontrol 01' the Moroooan 
bank, beoause 01' the great oommeroial lntenat, or should the vowing commeroe 
between Germany and Moroooo be permitted to grow? Should France oontrol the 
polioe toroe in order to proteot the border di.trlota of her own 0010n1e., or 
ehould GermaDy'. plan of an international polioe toroe be reoognized? 
But while ... were not 1fholly wUling to g1ve our lupport to either 
France or Oe1"ll1&111 where these _tter. _re conoerned, the pubUo and of1'1.01al 
opinion was almost unanimous in its baoklng 01' Franoe wh.n the diplomatio 
aituation was re"le.d. It.s not juat a que.tion ot loeing one or the •• 
countries as our triend, but Great Britain, another .8ry interested power, 
•• amciously _tohing to ••• what the United Stat ••• s tOint: to do. Would 
the United State. then ri.k ttl present diplomatio status in order to uphold 
ite atat ... nt that they were dtsinter.lted and un •• lfl.h, or would they beoome 
just a little interested and a little selfi'h, in order to obtain a rew 
powerful a11ie.? 
This diplomatio oorrespondenoe hinted at the an .... r, when Mr. Reid 
wrote in a _Ieage to Prea1dent Roo.eYe1ta 
The truth .... s to me that our relations with England are 01' rar greater 
importanoe to u. than thoae wi tb Germany. •• I oannot peraonally ... 
anything to be gained from unuaually good relationa with Germa~ whioh 
..... 
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compen.ate'" UI tor the lea.t jar in our relation. with Great Britain.l? 
Clara Sohieber oontends that the United Stat •• aotually •• pro-
Frenoh in her attitude, ohietly beoaus. Franoe .. s an .nemy ot Germany. It i. 
her beUet that Aaerioa t • attitude _. detinitely anti-Genaan beoau.el 
Sinoe 1865 when we LUntted S_te!! bad trouble w1.thGen:aany over the 
Samoan q \Batton. the United State. haa drltted eteadlly into dl .. pprO"f'&l 
ot GeJ'tJ'ltln XDal1t18rs and methods. .. d1eapproved of her behavior in Chi,., 
almost oame to blow. with her in the Philippine., feared her in the 
Caribbean and in South .... rioa. At the __ time our relatlona with 
Franoe improwd, ainae France _I Ger_ny'. neighbor and rival. To 
e.pha.he our dl .. pproval ot Oerman mil1taria ano imperiali .. , .. Ihowed 
approval of French polioy, eapeoially in toreign attaira. It Franae had 
been dl.puting with England or Italy in JIoroeco, it is oonoeivable that 
American s.yapathy might have been pro-Brittah or pro-Italian and W8 might 
have accused Franoe ot militaristio ambition., but Itnoe it _. w1.th 
Germany, our sympathie. were whole-heartedly French.16 
That the United Statel _I a_re ot what might happen to her 
diplomatio relationa with Britain was quite obvlou. troc ~h. foregoing 
atatement., but there was al.o an economic oondition to oon,ider in view ot a 
po.aible German triumph. fhi. waa pre.ented to Preaident Roo,.velt tn a letteJ 
trom Henry Cabot Lodge in whioh he .tat.d, 
I am very anxioWl that we should do all that 1, poadbl., to encourage 
amity with the Frenoh. Franoe Ihould be with U8 and ingland--ln our 
aone and our oombination. Such an aUp.ent would be 'OUn" eoonomically 
and politically. • •• It would be an evil day tor ua it Germany _re 
to oru.h Franoe. 19 . 
Another author expre8.ed our tntereated attitude tow.rd Franoe br 
17 Alfred L. P. Denn1a, Adventure. !!: Amer1can Dlp1omaol, New York, 
E. P. Sutton & Co., 1928, 607-6. 
18 Clara E. Schieber, Tran.tormation ot Amerioan Sentiment Tow.rd 
Germany, Reprinted trom The Journal of Interaatlon..1 Llition., XII, No. I, 
July, 1921, 65. 
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--saying, "Amerioa owes 80 much to France that there is not a request France i. 
ever likely to make that Amerioa would not deem it her duty to meet."20 
Could the United State. stIll deolare that they were uninterested 
in what would happen at the Algeciras Conference, when our diplomatic relations 
lwith Great Britain were at stake and when our debt to Franoe must be repayed? 
~t is true that the United States sympathized with Germa.ny tor being isolated 
~om the Euro~an diplomaoy in Atrica, or at least one writer olaimed it;21 
~ut was that sympathy so strong that ahe would endanger her own relations and 
~os8ibly isolate herself trom the good will ot England and Franoe? 
This was not probable, and as the oonterenoe oonvened one Amerioan 
lnagadne stated, "With all the Mediterranean powera, inoluding Great Britain 
~nd the United States. approving her position, Franoe has little to fear trom 
~n international conterenoe."22 Thi. opinion was oonfirmed by the ottioial 
~etter8 of Presiden~ Roosevelt, whioh will be dealt with in the tollowing 
~hapter. 
20 Andrew Carnegie, North Amerioan ReView, CLXXXI, 512-13. 
21 "Moroooo Conterenoe at Algeoira.," Xation, LXXXII, 31. 
22 Elizabeth White, 261. 
CHAPTER IV 
SECRET HISTORY OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 
Although it is well known that President Roosevelt supported the 
Algeeir.s OolU'erenoe in an attempt to Avoid any ,erious threat of war between 
Franoe and Germany over the Moroooan question, the aotual inside story ot his 
powerful position was not publioly made known until atter the oonterenoe. 
Joseph Buoklin Bishop, who had been in President Roosevelt's close 
confidenoe during most ot his publio oareer, reoeived a request from the 
President to write the history ot the period whioh oovered his publio oareer.l 
As a result, all his personal and ottioial oorrespondenoe was turned over 
exolusively to Mr. Bishop. Rooaevelt added to theae doouments, suggestions, 
inoidenta, and aneddo~es whioh make this work ot great historical value. 
ot primary tmportanoe to this paper are the seoret letter, exchanged 
between Rooaevel t and the Frenoh Almbassador, Jusserand, and the German 
Ambassador, Sternburg, whoa he refers to as Speck, and the Kais.r himself. 
These letters, whioh were not even published in the Blue Book, show step by 
--
step the prominent part played by Roosevelt in arranging the oonferenoe, and 
.ugge!llting ,om.p~ml.e8 between the Frenoh and German. governments. Mr. Bishop 
1 Joseph Buo~in Bishop (ed.), Theodore Roosevelt and Ris Time, 
New York, Charles Soribner. s Sons, 1920, I, Oh. Xi'Xft, vU.. --
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'" atat •• , -w.. eervio. aa peaoemaker i~ -bhi. Qontrover!IJY wa. equaled only by tha 
which at the same t1me he was rendering to the world in bringing to an end the 
war between Russia and Japan.-· HoweYer, Seoretary Root told Mr. Bishop, "I 
oonsider it of far greater importanoe to the world then the Portsmouth 
settlement. If! 
The souroe of Bishop'. info~tion oonoerning the Algeolrae Conferen •• 
i. in the form of a letter, addreesed on Apri~ 28, 1906 to Whitelaw Re1d, the 
,Amerioan Ambassador in X.ndon. This letter oontains all the oonfidential 
oorrespondenoe dealing with this matter. 
To supplement Mr. Bishop'S study of the Moroocan situation, another 
work, edited by Etling E. Mori.on, adds further light to this problem.' 
Despite these two exoellent works a oomplete investigation of President 
. . 
Ro08evelt's writings 1s impossible beeause three important colleotions are not 
available, namely, the Leonard Wood, the Henry Cabot Lodge and the George 
B. Cortelyon Colleotions. Moet of the material available for research 1IIOn 
oan be found in the Theodore Roolevelt Colleotion the Ubrary of Congrel8. 
The story all began on Maroh 6, 1905 when Sternberg oeme to the 
President with a message from the Kaiser, asking hi. to join with the Kai.er i' 
telling the Sultan of Moroocos 
That he ought to refom hie government, and that if he would do eo, the . 
• ~., 46T. 
3 ~., 468. 
, Etling E. Morison (ed.), the Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 
Cambridge, Mas •• , Harvard University Pre.s, 1961, 'iV. 
'" Un! ted States and Germany would stand behind him tor the open door and 
would au.pport him in any apposl tions he might make to all7 partioular 
nation Cmeaning FraRoe, ot ooureg which sought to obtain nolulive 
oontrol ot )101"0000. 
fbie message wal followed up the next day by another note .tating 
"the Emperor regarded Franoe and Spain al a 'political unityt who wilhed to 
di"ide up IIoroooo between them.el"es and debar her markets to the rest of the 
world."e The President answered the ~bove ~te by statlng, "I do not s .. ~ 
way olear to intertere in this matter, tor I do not think that our interest. 
7 
are suttioiently great." Ue then went on to express his friendlines. to 
Germany and to say that he beli."ed her polioy wal one for peaoe. 
The tirlt mention ot a oonferenee came on April 6, when in a 
oerrespondenoe with the German Ambassador, Sternberg mentioned that England 
and France were allies J and that Germall7 would like a oolderenoe to aettle the 
fate ot Moroooo. He went on to say in the words ot the kiler, "Germatl7 asks 
tor no gains in MOrooeol she simply detends her interests and stands tor equal 
rights to all nation' there. Selidel this she il bound to think ot her 
national dignity.wa Rere we have the old UbWritten imperialiltic rule, ~en 
one Great Power seise. an important oolony, it' ri"als may justly feel aggri.,,4 ~ 
if they be ignored, they should be oonsulted in advanoe, and permitted to se1&41 
I Ib1d., Letter trom William II to Roosevelt via Sternberg. 
-
e Ibid. 
-
? ..!2!!., lAtter trom Roosevelt to 1I1111em. II ,,1s 8ternberg. 
a Ib1"., -469. 
-
J 
» 
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.omething for thamaelves byway of oompensation." 
Another .uggestion came trOll the Kai.er on April IS, when .tating 
that, "he believ.d the attitude of England would depend upon the attitude of 
10 
the unit.d Stat ••• • Th.r.fore, he urged the United States to tell England 
that we thought th.re should b. a oonterenoe. Again on April 25 and May 11 
word oame tl"om the bi.er, through Sternberg urging the United Stat •• to 
approaoh England 1n the matt.r ot a oonterenee, and ina1sting that England 
n. the one who was opposing thi. oonf'er8l10e. The Kai.er 11.180 mentioned 111 
this memorandU1l. that Franoe had made an of'ter to oome to t.rm. but he expn •••• 
hl. vi .... in the.e word •• 
The Emperor .tate. that hi~ polio,y i. ab.olut.ly olear and .impl.. In 
.pit. ot sp.oial advantage,. of'f'fJred to him he .tand. by th., treaty right. 
granted to all~ Only if' h., .. hould di.cov.r that h •• hould r.oelve 110 
~PpO" ~om the Intereat.d treaty powers in oonn.otlon with the op.n 
deor and ~he oonteren.e, he would be toro.d to think of' Ger.many alone. 
Only then ~ Nld not betore • h. would have to choo.e between the 
po •• lbil1ty of a war with Franoe and the o:am1ning of tho.e oon.dltion. 
which hanoe _y have to propo •• , '0 a. to avold a war. l1 
FollOWing th~ Kal.er t • letter on May IS, Pre.ident Roo.evelt 
expre.sed his vi_ in the .tollowlng way, It ••• 1 very .1I10erely wish I oould 
get England and G.~ into trlendly relation •• ltla 
On Kay 29, the lai.er olaimed both England and Frano. had oftered 
9 Moon, 202. 
10 Bishop, 469, Letter trom Willlam II to Roo.ft'elt via Sternberg. 
11 Ibid., "'10. 
-
12 MOrilon, 1156, Letter trom Roosevelt to Ce011 Arthur Spring Rioe 
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a.~ a sphere ot Interest In 1101'0000 It ahe would aooept it and let the 
question remain quiet J but he had refused thls otter by saying he was tor the 
malntenanoe "ot the statue <luo and tor the open door and tor equal trea_nt 
ot all nation, whoae righta were established by treatle •• -18 
Rooan-e1 t' a own atti tude to'W'ard al~ thl, trouble wa.s let torth in 
. 
two letters whloh he wrote at thia time. The til' at was lent to hi' aoting 
$e.retary ot State, William Taft, and oontained the following message • 
.. , • The Kai.erts plp .. dr~ thls week takes the to~ ot Moroooo. 
$peok: (Sternberg) haa written me an urgent appeal to sound the Britlsh 
Govermnent and find out whether they intend to baok up Franoe In gobbliD 
Moroooo. • • • I do not teel that as a Government we should interfer. 1a 
the )(oroeoo matter. We have other fiah to try and we have no real 
lnt.r.st 1n Moroooo. I do not oare to take aldes between Franoe and 
Germany 1n the _tter. 
At the same time it I oan find out what Ger.raany wants I shall be glad to 
oblige her lt posaible, ahd I am slneerely anxious to bring about a 
better nate ot teeUng between England and Germany •••• I do not wish 
to auggeat anythlng whatever aa to England's attitude in Morocco, but 
it we can find out that attitude with proprlety and lnform. the W.er of 
it, I shall be glad to do so ••• but we D1Uat not make the English 
suspioiou. or lUke them think we are acting al4doo01 duoks for GeI"lB8J1Y 
••• 01', we ahall have to drop the busin •••• 
In hia s.oond lett.r to Sternberg. he reminded hlm that Rat the 
present moment I diaUke taking a position In any matter unle.s I tully 
intend to baok it up, and our Inter.sts in Moroooo are not suffioiently great 
to make me t.el juatified 1n entangling our Government in the matter. d.5 Re 
13 Bi.hop. 411, Letter trom William II to Roo.evelt via Sternberg_ 
14 Mor180n. 1161, Letter from Roo8evelt to Taft. 
15 Ibid., 1162. 
-
b 
'" then explained that the other tish we had to try.-Ohina, the Russo-Japane •• 
War, Santo Domingo, Ven.,u.la and Panama w.r. taking up a great deal ot hi. 
time. Assuring the German Amba.sador, how .... er, ot the interest ot the United 
State. to help avoid 1I'8.l" between France and Moroooo. he had instructed Taft 
to tind out from Sir Mortimer what the Bn ti.h Government f s views were in the 
matter. Ue oontinued, "I do not think I should go any further than thia at 
present." 
The.e two letters had been written by Roosevelt while he was awa)" 
froll Washington on a hunting trip, and when he returned at the end ot May, 
he m.et with both Juaserand and Sternb.rg. Bis reaotion to conterences was 
that a definite threat cf nr did exist between Ge:rm.any and Frano., but he 
alao senaed that both men t.lt that a oompromi.e should be made. Roosevelt 
b.li .... ed completely in the truthfulness of both ambassadors. and took them. 
into hil oontidenoe. This was not a mistake on his part, tor the ."ent. whioll 
followed proved that without the entire oooperation ot the thr.e, the 
luco.aatul agreement could not have b.en reaohed. 
In speaklngwith Sternb.rg h. diacovered that the Ambassador did 
not approve ot the action hia Government waa taking, but had to baok up it. 
position through loyalty. Th. French Ambaa.ador. on the other hand, upheld 
Frano.fs attitude that German)" was aaking tor too muoh, but he did aa)" that 
in order to avoid 1I1lr, 1 t might be bett.r to yield to Gel"DllUl)", a. tar a. the 
oontereno. waa conoerneet. 
}low the que.tion ot dealing with the British was quite din.rent. 
Rooa.".lt could not ,.t 010'. to Sir Mortim.r, and a conferenoe with him. 
r ..... aled no more than he alr.ad)" 1m ... , that England .... s bitter toward OeZ"lll8.n7. 
p 
and waa anxiOUI to I •• G.l"IJl&Jly humiliat.d by a refusal trom. Franoe to hold a 
oontereno.. Rooaevelt went on to aay. 
I did not think thia .howed muoh valor on th.ir part, although troDl 
th.ir point ot view it wal Agaoioul, al of oour •• in .uoh a war, where 
the British and Fr.noh fl.nl would be united, the G.rman fleetl oould 
have done absolutely nothing, while on land, where Germ.arlY was 10 
pow.rful, it would be France alone that would stand, and would have to 
atand, the brulXb of the battle.l~ 
It il 11ttle wonder then that Roolevelt decided ahortly atter this 
to ignore Ger.many'l appeal tor him to approach England on the question of a 
oonterenoe, and to oonoentrate his attention on negotiating direetly with 
Frano.. Since England had v.ry little to lose and everything to gain by a 
war between Prance and G.l"IIan3", h. felt it ..... u •• le •• to attempt further 
dealings with Sir Morti ... 1". Be added at thl1 time, "I delired to do anything 
I legitimately could tor F1"ance, beeaul. I like Franoe, and I thought her in 
thil inatance to be in the righ:ta but I did not intend to take any pelition 
whlch I would not be willing at all ooats te maintain •• 11 
Reolevelt had the •• deei.iona in mind when he r.o.ived anoth.r 
appeal trom. the Kai.er on June 11, urging him again to approach England on 
the qu •• tion ot a oonterenoe. Bil new appeal wa. baaed on the taot. that 
Mr. Rouvier, who had replaoed Mr. D.loe. ••• , had Ihown a more friendly attltud 
to Germany, and had indir.etly llltom.d the German Charge dtAttaire. in 
Paria, that England had made a tormal of tel" to Franoe to enter into an 
16 .!2!!., 475, Letter fttom Roolevelt to Whitelaw Reid. 
17 Ibid. 
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ott.live and dot.llvl al1181100 with Eugland whiob would 'bo directed &gab. 
Gftrmaay. But do'plte thi. n_ threat ot 1I'Ilr 1mo Kai,.,. t.lt that there wa. 
nlll hope. ItnO., itA" pre.et the leadiDg nate8llell of frelloe are oppo.ect te 
lUob an all18llOe, beoau •• the _jority ot the .... n 01 the '1"8I1Oh Go~ ... n.,_'DIIUtd 
atlll hope to oome to a tatl.t .. .,. ._.t with Qe~. -18 So he 
Itroag17 VIed BooI..,.elt to do IOIHth1ng 1.JIae41ately. or llae Fran .. 1I1gbb 
take thll otter -.Ie 'by JEnglu.d. ,M~t_pttng to rule out Roo .... l,,'_ earller 
arpaeat that the Unlted stat •• cUd DOt .1ab to lIlt.rteJlI 'iMoau •• 01 her othol 
1lUIIe1"01l' torel", prob1.1, h. added, 
I to.l thai; lt you oould dve .. blat In lM140D aad ill pan. tba" you 
would GOllllur a eoDtlrenoe ... the IlIOn _tlataeno". JIlftIl. to brlrag the 
Moroooo qu .. tloll to a pea .. tu1 IOlutlO1'l, )'Ou would ....... thl peace of 
,be world .. ther great lenlOl, wlthout 8DOOW.lMrillg ... rt.k. 
After W. ..aIUNIlOO tba' the UaJ. ted stn.a n.ed DOt tear AD)" rl.1t 
tor her.elt. ho agaiD. ola1Md that he had 'boen ottered "" aphe,.. of lDt1u.oe,t 
bY' th. Fl"GIlOh. ~ .iaol G.~ •• ple4ge4 by hODOr to ltand by'tb. Su1t_. 
b. oould not 111 oou01en.. "co.p' tbla ott.r. In hi. 0WIl word. the Kall. 
old, "IUtre 1 ... ovlou .... ,-We _y 'bo toroed tniH» war not " .... u ...... ha .... 
be.n poabblng after people" laa4, 'but beoaa ••• e refu.e 110 tate It.,,19 
Dellplte the Kal .... '. oontlaual warrd.ng tbat war wa. in .. ltable, 
Roo .... 1t did not t •• l that tbing' were quit. that bad, .lNt Ilcwertb.l •••• be 
prooeecled wl1Jh hi. plan to IUgglat the atteJl' of a oontel".noe to the fNnoh 
18 Dld... .'8, tnt.r fna lfllllM II to Boo ..... l' via· Stal"Dbera. 
19 IbU. 
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instead of th.~Engli.h. Thil he did in a .erie. ot oommuD1oation. with the 
Frenoh Government through Ju •• erand. 
RooleTelt alsured the French that he wal propolingthil oonterellOl, 
because he had a real sentiment for Frenoh J and he would no _re adri.le her t 
do a~hlng humillating cr disgraoeful for Franoe, then he would it it we,.. 
his cnm. oountry. Furthermore, he war~ed France not to plaoe too much 
coutldenoe in the prom,el made by England~ beoause in oal. ot a war, it 'IfOul 
be France not England that would have to .t"n4 the danger ot inyasion by land 
low, it a peaoeful agreem~nt waf to be reached some arrangement would have to 
be made to help Germany save i tl .eU-re'l>eot, because although Gel'lllall.)" Jldgh 
be willing to drop the matter ot Morooco at thl. time, she oould not do '0 
graoetully, due to all the publioity that had been g1.'nn to thll question in 
reoent monthl. lie then reooJllllended that France aubml t to the oonterenoe. aa 
mean. ot helping the ltai.er save his taoe. ae further alsured the French 1Iha 
it there waa a oonterenoe ot the Great Power. 
Franoe would have flVery reaMn to believe that the conferenoe would not 
lanotion any unjust attaok by GermaDJ upon Frenoh intereata, and that it 
all 1Ihe Power., or praotically all the Powers, 1n the oonterenoe took an 
attltude tavorable to Franoe on .uch • polnt it would be well-nigh 
impo.sible tor Germany to a8.ail her.20 
Then he concluded hi. luggeatlon with a premi.e, whlch 110 doubt oonvinoed 
France that her interest I in Morocco .ere not 1n danger, tor Roolevelt lald, 
I would not acoept the 1nvitatlon of the oonterenoe unle'l Pranoe wal 
willing, and that if I went in I would treat both lide. with ablOlute 
3unioe, and would, if nece'lary, take very strong groundl againat any 
attitude of Germany which .eemed to .e unju8t and unfair. 
20 Ibid., 478. 
-
Following thia communioation to the French GoTernaeut. oame a reply 
on June 28 hom the French MUliater of Foreign Altairs, 111 whioh he said that 
the Frenoh Government had agreed to the conferenoe becauae "hia Roosevelt's 
ide ... and adTioe inspired it. If Rowever, h. presented these nn problema. 
First, tha German Ambas,ador refused to di80u,s what matters would be present. 
at the oonterenoe, and ola.1Jlled. that Germ&D7 wal merely calling tor a oonter.n~ 
~,. flo ~eltion ot torm and ot .tiqu8'bte in order to teat the right ot the 
aigua1foi"ypowers to the ConTention of kdrld. Be assured the French that he 
wanted only to inaure the open-door polioy, and that oth.rwi,e Franoe ooull 
take up the realization ot her pro~ Franoe believed otherwis., and waa 
anxtous to have a definite program mapped out betore the conferenoe oouvaa.d. 
Seoondly. the ni,er had. talcen neps to lntol'Dl the Frenoh 1n Pari, that all 
the toroe, of aer.many were behind the Sultan of Moroooo, and, ~e uses the 
moat menaoing language towards us at Washington. at loae, and at Madrid.-
That the henoh were tald.ng aeriously Roosevelt's promiae to ""aD 
"-17 strong grounds against eJ1y attitude ot aerallY whioh seemed to .. unjun 
and untair," was qui te evident in. the to llowing m.saage dell "red through 
Jus.erand from 'bhe French G,oTel'Dm.8J1t. 
tell him that the exoeptional authority .hloh attaohes to hl1 counsel, 
not only beoallS. ot hl, ottioe, but also beoause ot hil oharaoter, bis 
sens. ot right and jUltioe, and his olear perception ot 'What are the 
h1ghest lnter.,ts, quality h~ in supreme degree, to intervene ln favor 
ot the -.intenanoe ot peaoe. The insiatenoe with whioh the Emperor hal 
appealed to him, hal lett the way open tor the2i"s1dent to take the in1tiativ. that we expect trom hi. friendship. 
21 Ibid., 480. Letter trom French Kin1ster ot Foreign Attairs 110 
Roosevelt Tia Juaserand. 
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Following this letter JU8serand and Roosevelt held a oonter.noe in 
which they discu8sed the next move to make toward Germany, 8inoe certain 
disagreement. had to be straightened out. Roo.evelt informed Jusaerand that 
he would talk with Baron Sternberg immediately. Sternberg brought with him. 
a letter from the Kaiser, stating that he greatly appreciated the ohange whi 
was notioes in the policy of Franoe slno. the aotion t &.ken by Roosevelt as 
regards the Morooco question. Ue added, "Your diplomatic activity with 1'. 
to Franoe has b.en thegr.atest blessing to the peace of the world. ftll 
~qQsevelt then wrote three letters to St.rnberg which were to be forwarded to 
the Iaiser, but before doing so he showed them. to Juaserand in order not to 
arouse any ,uapioitm,of double dealing on his pan. 
The l.tter. contained the following atatemeata, 
••• 'lh. Frenoh Gov.rmaent informs me unoffioially through the 
ABba •• ador that 1t has ceas.d in its oppo.ition to a oonterenoe of the 
pGWeJ'8 1n 1Iorocoo. It leems a. a matteJ' of oour.e that a progl'1!QIl of the 
conteJ'enoe would be needed in advance in acoordanoe with the usual 
ou.tom. &I! .uch oa.... I suggest that be arranged between Germany and 
France. lia 
this 8\1ggestion, if followed by G.rmaIl)", would solve the first 
problem presented by the Frenoh, but now came the difficult part of warning 
Germany not to push the French too tar. In his most diplomatic lDI'Umer, ha 
began by building up the ego of the Kaiser in these words. 
Let _ oongratulate the Emperor most warmly on his diplomatio suoces. in 
seouring the aBsent of the FJ'8lloh Gov.rnment to the holding of this 
oonfeJ'eno.. • • I need not say to you that I consider &UGh peacefUl 
22 )forison, 1251, Letter trom Roosevelt to St.rnbeJ'g. 
23 Bishop, 482, Letter from Roosevelt to St.rnberg. 
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solution ••• vitllly n .... 6J7 to the welfare of the world at thU tl.rle .. 
and 1n vs._ ot it. hav1Dg been .eOtU"flld by the J.}mpet"Ol'" 8\lcoe •• 1n 
obta1n1nc thi. OOl.'tt.-enoe. I wish ap1n to apre •• ur,y h~y_~ __ 
lations. It 1 •• diplomatio triumph ot the first ~tude." -
Roo ...... lt then expla1nM why be had approaohed Fl'anoe aM not 
Eu.glaQd Gn tbe queatlon ot the tJOttf'wenoe" crtating that England bad noth1nc 
to 10 •• and 'WOuld probably pront' p'etdily by the loBB of G~' oolont •• 
fllD4 t1Mb. ne CUURll'"ed the KalBO,.,. as he bed prftiouB1y aeaur«t the J'renoh. 
that be would advl.e Ge~ to do DOthing whloh Wtlld humiU,ate aDd diagraM 
h .. in tbe eye. of the world. In f'e..ot he wou14 not have ott.ad hi' 
IUggeation. to ~ unle .. Germany bad Ul"pct hSa to work tor the eo~ ....... _ 
1n the flret plue. Jut .ino. be had spokeD to FwAsloe and I1noe the ocmte:r-
ROe ft. apa.d upon. b. felt lt hi. obligatlon to maD a .fttrother .t;ateMtD.\ 
of' hi. vlen. With tM .• latroduotol"Y " ••• 18 ot oongatulat1ona and expla-
nation of hi. rea.one tor nat1ng hi. opinion at thi. time. Roo ..... 1t 
proo.e4e<1 with tbe lmponant pan of' M. 1nter. 
• • • I tft1 that .tlOIr .. bItriAg obtalne4 what he Lib. ltala-i7 aalta. So" 
would be moat UIlforbunate eva to .... 'to rel .. questloDl about mlz:&ol' 
clftal1 •• to ... 1t un4.r 8UOh oil"OUIDItanoq the dne.df"u1 oalud.t7 of war 
Gh&u14 bappetl" I fear tthat h18 hlgb and hor..ol"ab1e f.e mlgllt be o~ 
ae baa _n .. ;reat tnumpb, be hal obtain_ what hl. oppoileDt. lrl 
JDgland and. 'reno. IIdd M DeftI'" wuldolrba1u.. aDIl what X ... U 414 IlO'b 
be11,,,," be oould obta.ln. the r.wlt 18 a ltr1ld.ug tribute to bbl'D4tl v.~..aIl-t 
a111' D.O le •• tball ~ hi. aatlon. and I .arne.tly hope that be 08A •• 
M •• 1 olear 1;0 a(IMpt lt .e tb. triumph it 1 •• 81 
For ...... l"a1 ... tollorll.rlg thl .... sage to ~ tbeH .. a 
24 Jl.!!." I..etsWl" tnm Roo ...... l, to Wl111am It •. 
26 MoI'laon.. 126'. Ltrbte1" from Roo...,..1t 1:;0 Steft4berg. 
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great deal of blokering between the Frenoh and Germane over the progre.. of 
the oontereno., and 1 t looked: doubtful whether hoh a m.ettng 'WOuld take plao 
after all. Once again Sternb.rg and Jua.erand oame to Rooley.lt tor a 
solution, and h. advl •• d th_ both to .end the tollowtng •••• age to their 
Gove1"D1lGta t "The two Govel"tml4n\. oon.ent to go to the coat.renoe with no 
progr .. , and to di.ou •• there all q~e$tlona In regard to MOrooco, aave ot 
course where elther il 1n honor 'bou~ by • pJ!lI'fiou. agreement 'With another 
power."ae Jle then atated that he dld not want &r17 publlolty to b. given to 
him tor hls work on the oonferenoe, 81noe he 'WOuld rather 11'1 b. thought that 
Frano. and GermanY' came to the agreement 011 th.tr OWD.. 
loth gov.rnments agreed to thls auggestlon and G.~ ~ded, 
"that 111 ease during the confer.noe dU'f.rence. of opinlon should. aria. 
between France a.n4 Ge~, he /jhe KatHil 1n .... ry case will be 1""""'1 to 
baok up the deolalon whloh you [Roos8Vel~ .hould oonsider to be the moo 
tall" and the most praotloal.".' 
J 
!hl. d..,ls10n wal reaohed on June 28, and al the conference was 
not to begin untl1 January 6, of oourle a new problem aro.e ln the meantime. 
The latler became worrled about where the oonterence would be held, and who 
the Frenoh 'Were sendlng a. a delegate. Ue 'Wanted. the meetlng to be at 
Moroooo and he did not want· the Frenoh to lend Revoll al a d.alegate. The 
26 Bishop, 485, tetter from Roosevelt to Sternberg and JUI.erand. 
27 Ibid., 481, Letter from Sternb.rg to Roolevelt. 
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matter waa oleired up quiokly end then Rooa.,.elt informed Jua.erand that 
.ince the Gonterenoe had been arranged to save taoe tor the Kai.er, he would 
.ugge.t that "the Fre~ch Government should not let their people boaat or be 
disagreeable and try to humiliate the leaiaer in conneotion with the coaterene 
beoause the important point wal tor them to pis the kernel ot the nut, and 
they did not have to consider the 8he~1.ft28 
Although Roos.,.elt's trust in Gel'JlllUlY concerning the oonterence _ • 
• haky, he put complete confidence in Sternberg, whom he .t"ngly auspected 
was not himselt in tavor of Germany'. policy, but at this time he also became 
unsure of France, and it waa only hia taith in Jul.erand that enabled h1m te 
negotiate with contidence. Gel"Zll1D.y .eemed moat anxious at this time to .... ur 
the Un1 ted State. that all the Power. exoept England .. re bacld.ng her at the 
conferenoe, although botb Ru.sia and Italy pleaded with u. to dosomethlng to 
keep Gel"1ll&J1Y hom gaining a sphere ot in.tluence in .1'0000. Of oourse n 
lmew Austria was in favor of Germany, but Roosevelt knew that Austria was .. 
ure 08:t'a-paw tor Germany_ 
It aoon bee .. e olear that Germaaywa. departing from her original 
plea tor the open-door polioy 1n Moroooo, aince ahe began demanding a port 
tor herself', and. then a .eapon tor Holland or Switaerland, adjaoent to her 
own, whioh would 1n the eyea of the other diplouts, .,.entually beoome 
Gel"Jl8B1's. The French retlased to g1:"e in on the.e points and the United 
States' view was announoed as "the intereats of France and Spain in Morocoo 
28 .!!!!!_, Ch. XXXVII. 488, Letter from Roosevelt to Ju ••• rud. 
are tar veater" than thoae of other po1Nl"8. tt29 
On lartue.ry 29 Gel"lllN17 suggeated and aaked the Un1 ted State. to 
propo.e "to entrust the Sultan of 1101"0000 wlth the organtlation of the poli .. 
foroe. within hia domaina and to allow him. oertain tund., and to establ18h 
art international oont1"Ol w1th regard to the management ot the.e funda, and 
the oarrying out of the whole plan. "SO. The United State. of oourae did not 
favor .uoh a pl8l'l beoause French interena were far more important in tbl. 
reglon end 1f the Sultan were given such power., lt waa quite likely that he 
would f ..... or the German.. whOle lntereata were Do1J '0 long .tending nor •• 
predominate aa tho •• of the French. 
Therefore O'n February 19. Roo ...... lt instruoted Elihu Root to send 
the follow1ng plan to the Kai.er. which he oalled a modll108.tlon of Ge~t, 
augge.tion. 
1. That the organization and maintenanoe of polioe toroe. in all the 
port. be entrusted 'bo the Sultan, the men and offloer, to be 1Ioors. 
2. That the money to maintain the foroe. be furniahed by the proposed 
tnternational bank, the stook of which ahall be allotted to all the 
powera in equal ahare, (exoept for some emall pref.renoe. olaimed by 
Franoe, which he oonsider. immaterial). 
s. that duties of instruction, disoipline, pay and aa.i.ting in 
management and control be entruated to Frenoh and Spaniab oftloer. and 
non-commissioned officer., to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation 
of name. by their Legations. 
fha'b the Senior FreJlOh and Spanish instructing offioer. report 
annually to the ~~~ent at MOroooo, and to the government of Italy, 
the Mediterranean Power, which shall have the right of inspeotion and 
29 .!!!!.. 489. 
30 Ibid.. 490. 
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verit1oation, and to demfU).d further report. in behalf of and tor the 
information ot the Power.. The expense ot auoh inspeotion, eto., to be 
deemed a parb of the cost of the polioe maintenance. 
4. That lull a.aurance be given by. Franoe and Spain, and made obligato 
upon all their otficer. who ahall be appointed by the Sultan, tor the 
opendo.or, both a. to trade. equal treatment ftd opportunity in 
competItion for public works and conce.aiona. 
Roosevelt then concluded by aaying that in such 8A agrs .. zrt 
Germany would be cons.rving her prinoiple of the open door, and France would 
be making conce.sion. wb1ch it would be entirely possible for her to make. 
therefore, ttl think it is talr, and earneatly hop. that it may receive the 
Raperorts approval.-
Germany" reply- to the toregoing program was not, how..,.er, sati .. 
faotol'y. As to point. 1. 2 and 4 they were given approval with the oendltion 
that the .. cond point, the question of granting France a slight preterenoe, 
be di.ous.ed. But 1r.t regard to the third point GermaD7 ...... strongly oppo.ed. 
They Itated that this was in tact the main gi.t of the lateat French propo.al, 
N44 t;hat Chtl"J'.ll&lly 'ftS objecting to lt on the ground. that euch a .et-up would 
plaoe the polloe toroe. ent.irely in the hand. of France and Spain. To rem.,. 
thi •• ituatloD the _perol" 'uggeated, 
••• that the Sultan ahould have a tree oho!" among the other nation. 
• • • al'Jd in cas. France ahould tear that under the pre •• t condi tiona 
the Sultan m1ght tavor Gel":ll'W1 otficer., that at least tour difterent 
nationalities should be taken 1nto oenalderation in an equal manner. 
Ultimately, so as to aoknl')W1«'.ge the .peei8.1 ri~t. ot Franee 1n 
Moroooo, the Sultan might place the po11oe control 1n Tangiers. and 
perhaps in .ome other po.ri, entirely in the bands ot hemoh ot:tioers. 
31 Ibid •• 490-1. 
-
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In all the other ports offloers of varlous natlons would oooperate.31 
The Kalser then added that he hoped the Prelll1dent would broaden his proposal 
for mediation aooording to the above plan. 
It 18 qul te olear from RooI..,.elt t s reply that he ftS no longer 
g01l1g to treat Germany 111 a gentle manner. Ue atated that he did not feel 
that he oould ask France to make ~ further oonoes.ions, and that he would 
11ke to drop the entire matter, but telt 'that ,sinoe he had luggened the 
oonrerenoe he would like to do ell he could to &Told a war. RemincU,ng the 
Kai.er again that he had suggested the oonterenoe only because of Ge~. 
urging., he aapha8iaed the Kailert • willingne.s to oooperate by quoting the 
following passage troa a letter of June as, 19051 
The Emperor has requelted ae Sternberg to tell you that in ca.e, 
during the ooaing oonterenoe, d1fterenoel of opin1on Ihould arile 
between Franoe and Germany. he. in fJVerr oase, will be ready to baok up 
the deoision whith YO'Q should oonsider to be the most tair and the 
mon praotical. $1 
Ue continued, 
under the oirouutanoes, I feel bound to nate to Your lIajest,. 
that I think the arrangement lndioated in my letter of Febrt.ULlT 19ish i. 
a reasonable one, and moet arneatly urge Your kje.t,. to aocept it. I 
do not know whether Franoe would aooept it or not. I think she ou~ to 
do 10. I do not th1nk that she ought to be expeoted to gt) further. 
ne pOinted out that if Franoe agreed to auoh an arrangement, ahe 
32 .!!2!., 492, Letter trom William II to Roolnelt via Sterbberg. 
33 Ibid., 49S11 
-
34 Ibid., 493-4, Letter from RooI..,.elt to William II. 
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would 'be giT1ng 1ll to the extent that she would have joint responsibiUt,. 
with Spa1.n, and would be an .... rabl. to all the other Powers tor the _1llten8ll 
of these right.. III addl tton Gel'llB1'lY would have tult111ed her purpo.. in 
ealling the oentereneM, namely, the prinoiple of open-floor. As an additlonal 
W8.l"B1ng, Roos."elt .. 14, 
• • • I ,.. grave reaaona to apprehend that 1t the eonterenoe should tat 
beeaus. ot Germa,nyt s inslating upon pre.dng Fran_ beyond the _asure 0 
oono ••• ion de.ribed in this proposed a.rrangement, the general OpWOIl 0 
Europe and America would be untavorable, and Ge1"mllllY would lo.e that 
inor .... e of oredit and moral power that the maklng of 'bhis ~
would seoul'4t to her. and. Ddght b. held re.pon.ibl. probably tar beyond 
the Um! ta ot .. eaeon. tor all the ml. tha'b .y GOJU in the train of a 
dieturbed oon41 tton of affair. in Europe. • • throw upon France the 
reepon.lblU:by tor Z"ejeoting, it i'b 1. to be reject.d, the nggened 
arrangeraent.85 
The Ial.er replied by again 'bhanking Roos ..... lt tor hi' hard work in 
trying to solv. the probl __ , but added that after givlng oonsiderabl. thoug~ 
to the matter, h. nill telt that some alteration should be mad. to IDHtl the 
1nt.rnational ,ide of the qu.stion, aln .. Franoe nu14 be obtaining a Gena 
mnopoly in 1Ioroooo which would not result in .conomio equality tor the eth .. 
nations. Be then Rid that Auatrla-Bung&ry' had IUbmitted .. plan whioh h. 
telt would be .. gr .... bl. to Rooaevel t and the other Powera. !his plan contalD 
the tugg.ations th .. t instead ot entrusting the .rooo&11 porta to oontrol by 
'bhe Spanish and Frenoh jo1ntly, all eight po:na ahould be dlstributed. 
Aooord1ngly. the plan of dlatrl.butlon thould work ae tollo1l'8' the poliee in 
tour porta ahould b. organ1 •• , by the French, ill thr •• the poll.. should b. 
as .!2.!!.. 494-6. 
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organized by the Spanieh, end the laat either the SwiIS or the Du'beh. abould 
organi.e the polioe. 16 
!he United Statea objected seriously to tni. suggestion because 
they telt 1t ..... oonttu'Y to the very prinoiple tor which the conference na 
held, namely, prcv1ding tor the open door. It would mate little differenoe 
according to the Original prinoiple wbe'bher Franoe were given cOD:brol of all 
the porta or whether they were distributed aocorci5.ng to the Auatrian plan. 
Germa'lly then .. ,aured the United Stat.e that tbey .. ere lOrry that 
their attitude had relulted. 1n certain m1aunderatand1nga, but that they .. ere 
oenain theae miaunderatanding. would be r8llOved eaal1y. 
By 'bbi, t1me Pre,idet Roo • .".elt ft.a becom1ng weary ot the 
biokering employed by Ge1"DUUl)" over the control ot the polioe 1n the ports and 
he aent the toll.o1ring meaaage to the klaer, which he had tormerly given 
verbally to Sternberg. 
• • • 1f the Emperor peraevered in rejecting our propo, .. la and a. break-
up ensued. I abould feel obliged to publish the entire oorre.pondenoe, 
and that I believed that our people would teel a grave auspicion ot 
Germany· 8 juatloe and good faith. but if the Emperor would yield to 
what .eem.M to me OUF very tair propoeall, I should not publ1ah any ot 
the oorrespondenoe, and Wfj!uld endeavor in every way to g1 ve Germany full 
oredit tor what was done.!7 
fhia evidently.a. exaotly what the Kaiaer did not want the world 
to know, tor the publication ot theae document. would throw a very untavorabl 
light, upon G.~.a aotion. They had demanded a conterence with the 
16 Ibld., 498. 
-
81 Ibide, 600, Letter trom Roo.flYelt to William II. 
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4eo1aration thlt their .01. lntent ft. to uphold the principle of the o~n 
~or lXl MoJ"OOoo~ !he eone.ponden04J of tbl. periad r .... ealed, hewner, that 
~D1 -p.. aotually .eeking ._.thing for her.elf. In add! tion to hoping to 
aoquire .cae territory, Germany allO wished to make the other European 
ooulltrie. re .. 119 that Germany ft. now one of the Great Power.. and mtUJt .. 
theretore, be 00118U1ted in matter. of international importanoe. By agreeing 
to the plan of Prelident Roosevelt they would be given oredlt for the suoce •• 
of the conterenoe, an4 thereby" re.el ve the public &oolala tor which they 
lought. 
A tew daya atter receiving the Prelident'a proposal, Germany yield 
to hi" plan. frue to hia wrd, Preaid.at Rooane1t gave G8l'1D&Jly the ored1t 
he had promised them. On April 12, 1906 while addreasing a group ot German 
"9'trberana he Itated, 
• • • It i. not out ot plaoe in ololing tor .. to aay a word ot 
oongratulation. both to the Ge:rman people and the German Emperor. upon 
the wor'kthaii hal b.en Moompliahed :l.n the Algeoiral Conterence wh10h 
hal juat ololed. a Oo~eren •• held ohiefly because ot the 1n1tiatly. ot 
GeJ"lllaDy.$8 
lAter, when lpealdng ot this inoident President Roo.evelt .ald, -In 
thl, A1geoiraa matter. you will notlce that while I ft. ''WITe and p1ea.lU1t 
with the Emperor, yet when lt became n84e •• vy e.1: the cd I nood h1a on hi. 
head with great d.al.10n.-19 
fhe.e letter. which were &ddre.,ed to Whlte1aw Reed, and oopie. ot 
38 Ibid., 501-2. 
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which _1". to o. sent to Meyer and White, were requetted by the PNsidetrb. 
"to be consider.d as of the moat atriotl,. confidential oharaoter.-40 
Forbunately ta~ us the.e letter. did become public ana shed an entIrely 
different light on the situation. Wltho~t th. .. ~~would have been difficult 
1» realiz. Germany" true prupe •• in demanding the aonterence, and would hav. 
lett the offioial Am.el"ioan attitude t~d the trouble 111 1101"0000 uncena1n 
in the eye. of the world. 
AMERICAN ATflTODE '.rOWARD mE RESULtS 
OF 'l'BE OOIFERE.IOE 
idore ia.ventgating the American attitude toward the .. e.ultl ot 
the Algeoml centerenee, the following were the provisionl ot the General. 
.Aet, 
~. fbe iD.4epell4 ... ot )(01"0000 ftS .. eoop1.ed in the preamble. 
2. GoveJ'lllUllt tinanoel 'ftl"e to be entruated to a state Bank at '.rangier, 
JJUU:l.aged b7 tour oeuon appoint", reapeotl".elY', bY'the Dmsohe Bank •. 
the hnk 01 Engl", and Banqu ••• hem_, and the Bank ot 'paill. 
!he .. pl tal .... to be aublorlbld 1n equal parta by the .ignatory 
power.. exoepting that haae. ahould have the larger ahul. 
S. Cult .. duties Are placed under international supen1.a1on. 
4. Cono •• slona or oontraata tor publl0 Yorke were to be granted upt'J1 
im.partial ad.3ud1oat1oJ1, wh1ch would aooept; the moat tavorabls bld. 
reprill.. ot the nat10nall ty ot the bidder. 
5. A toroe ot 2,000 to 25,000 arm.e4 Moroocan poliN wa. to be organia., 
under 16 to 20 French and Spaniah ottieerl, all4 30 to 40 Frenoh ana. 
Spaniah lUbaltvu. 
'lbe otfioerl _uld be Spu1.h at el"ain ports, Fretloh at other., 
and mixed at the rest. 
However, the whole police administration was to be .upervised by a 
Swi.s oftieer., .a :mapenor General. l 
It 'WOuld appe8l", on the surtace.. that Germany fta ".iO'bcrioul in 
1 American Journal of International La1lf' (Supplaell'b), H. York, 
Balce .. , Voorhis &: do., 1901, 1,41.56. -
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obtain1Dg their demand.. 81n08 international oontrol ot Iloroooo wal subnitut 
for Deloa".'a plan ot enabliahing a French proteotorate over IOroooo. 
However, France had lucceeded in .llurlng her.eU of the supports ot Englan4, 
the neutrality of Italy $lld 1flle trtelldl1De •• of the United Stat... 80" while 
fran.e wa. unable to &Ohi ... e her lmme41ate objeot, ahe DO doubt felt atronger 
now that ahe Gould nuriber .0 many great power. ameng her friend.. !ba1l 
PFe.ldeD.t l.oo • ..,.e1' lided with the frenoh il quite evident after viewing the 
leoret letters of th1s period, and that moat of the Ameriean pUblie agre04 
with the outo .. of the oonterence oan be leen from. the oblenation' made bJ' 
the pre.. • although they were not exolu'i""ely pro-French. 
8oDt4 of the les. obl.rv1l1g OGlD.ent. oonoeJ"D1ng the reaultl ot the 
oonterenoe. lUllllJJU'"iled the oute .. al a gain tor both Ge~ md France_ and 
al.o a 101. tor both oountrie.. The.e eon.lusion. were ba.ed on the t&Ot. 
that Franoe gained &Xl international aokrlowledpent of her ol.a1ma to speoial 
right. in territor1al, administrative, and finanoial lnterest., that .he 
gained oontrol of the polioe in tour important port. and control with Spain 
of two cnherl J and that the J'reneh o1alm to a vea"'er ahare in the )Ioroeean 
State leak t;han the other powers ft. agHe4 to b7 the Gonterenoe. On the 
other haDd, France was not allowed to enabliah a frenoh proteotorate of 
IIoroooo.8 Gel"JJl&Dy' at the same time gained by torcing Franoe to plaoe the 
entire polioe ot Morocco uud.er an in.peetor, ad to oompel the Frenoh to 
-63 
admit Spain a. --" dual ool'lvol of the _rocOq poll0.. A. to what ..... 1 .... 
by G~. lt .... ola1m.a. by the Germazt Colonlal Sooiety' and the Pan-Germauo 
League, although not oltlolally approved by the bl •• r.. that the ohi.f hope 
of Ge1"Dl&l1Y .a to g.t oontrol of on. of the JIoroGcen pon. and al.o .f 
important oOlllD.erolal oono •• l1on.. In W •• ot cour .... til.., .tailed. 3 
Reading ~en the Un •• , another 1tud.7 pointed out that "both the 
id4taa of Ge~ &Ad the polloy ot I'ra.noe have be. pr •• e"K by the 
.ot'l1.81_.'" !he author .... 11.1= on to explain that the French poU . .,. of pennra-
tlon lnto Moroooo waa atill poa8ible, through th.1I' almoat unqu.nlone4 oontl"O 
of the poli .. aDd bank, but that the French had motUfled ».1 ..... '. plana. 
Ge.rJrtany" Id •• 01"8 pres.l"Ved in 'bhat ah. auat be oOl1wlt.d in Ked1tenoan ... 
matter.. llow$Ver. It 1. doubttul. whether tbl. r.ally was a pm hr hJl!/ll.t.l17', 
aiD •• the v1rtual 1101at1011 of G81"JD1\1'1y' wa. &pp81".nt at the ta. 01 the 
oont.1"8noe. A. waa .tated prmoul1y ha.noe ft. a •• ur" of EIlgl .. d" Appon, 
the neutrality of Ita17 and the fri.endllne., ot .A.ilwrloa. Add to ttll. 'bhe 
probabls aupport of Ruesta. once they reoover.d hom th.lr wa.r with iapea, an4 
lt leave. only Aunrla-Rung&l7 a. an ally tor Gel"JlNlY. 
In dl.ousa1n.g the oombined Spanlah and Frenoh control of the poll" 
in MOrooco, .tlll another oonolu.lon ..... logical. 'raRo. actually dtd not 
10.. anybblng in agneing to 'bhl. jolnt oentrol beoaus. 1D. an ..... 11.1" 
agreement ~. with Spain, b.fore attempting to pu~ into 1101"0000. Franoo ha4 
8 Ibld •• 788. 
-
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recogrd.aed certain rights 01 Spain to this _"ito17 ud 'bhua, had hiILt" a'b 
allow1ng Spain to help them in poUeing the tel"l"ltory, should they aucceed in 
armexing it.5 So when P'l"anoe agreed to thl. daaand of the delegate at the 
oOllference, they.ere probably putting 1nto operation the very plan tMy, 
thatelve. had entertained for IDIU!l¥' rear •• 
While France, then could vi_ with pnde the oonorete gaiu they 
had ma4e as a result of the eonterenoe, G~ felt that they ha4 saved fad 
in the eyea of the world.· It waa thia argument that President Roo ..... lt ba4 
uae4 to eonvinoe the Kaiser to come 'to terms at the a •• emb17, when wv 
threatened. It _y have been an empty honor that ~ had ma1Dtalned, in 
their right to be oonsulted in lIediterranean affair., but in the diplomatl0 
relation. of the European ooulltriea. it was an all 1mportan'h honor, ..,.oiall~ 
to Germany, who wa.. without ftJ"Ong alU ••• 
U the statement made by the Pan-Germanio League and the Ge~ 
Colonial 800iety had not been _de known to the rest of the wr14, eono.rn1ng 
the German plan to galn oontrol of a lfol"OOoan port and lmportant OODII'Ilel'ol~ 
oonce.sion., the Ge1".l1lan po.it10n at the centerenoe may have bHn received 1n 
a very favorable 11ght. Iv1denoe of thi a oan be ••• n from a popular Amerioan 
attitude apr ••• ed ju.at a fft day. prlor to the relea •• of the atat-.ent 
ma4e by the above societies. thia particular anicle waa quoted by an 
American periodical, atter it had first appeared 1n Englan4. and 1t baoked 
Git1"lll8l1Y in i 'ba d.and for a conterence by e.dm1 ttlag that, "Ge~ waa 
5 "Outcom.e," 14.;v:1ng!l!.. CCIL, April 28, 1906, 242. 
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morally and. llplly junU1.ed 1n dHl1a1ag to acoept the Anglo-French 
agreement 1n re.peo1J to )(OroO('lO, beoaWlI it, too, was a slgaatory ot the 
Madrld Contereno. 1». 1880.,,6 '.rhu., 1t GeI'JlCUly were merely upho1cU.ng thi. 
inteJ"J1atlonal pr1n.clple of the &p4tn door 1D. lIoroooo, any Aa.ri08.l1. lIIOu14 ao 
doubt have alded with Ge~ &p1nat 'rance, but once their on .ell1ah 
intereat. beoaae ..,.l'4ent, thelr IUppoz:ter. became t.er. 
Certainly the oftl01al reault. of the coatereno. agr.~t 414 Bat 
t.ll the entire ROJ')" of the ge1na and 10.... of the .. JIUt at 1n.t.reated 
pow.... One author 1I'4hlt 10 far a. to olala that the oft101al relUl.t. JIl8.tterea. 
/ 
to no one, and that the main question wa., "I. W.er Wilhelm. to be tre.:tJect u 
the OVerlord of Evope, without -.m.. •• author:batlon DO treatle. or oomentlou 
are b1nd1ng."" S. oontbluN by 1nterpre1iing the "eol.10n with the.e word., 
"JIo. • • he i. no1; yet the ling of Ung. and Lord. of Lori •• " It wa_ with 
great pleasure that tbl. aubhor sa Ge~" plau of gaining gnund in 
IIoroooo haltect, for h. addN, "Prlnoe Bulow without ~ repen'banoe adm1tted 
after the oonteraoe, that GeJ"lll8rlY'. alleged oomm.erola1 1J:J:tereat wa. jun a 
.oh ... "S 
A more pe.aUdatl0 refleotlon on the re.ulting ooatr.l of Moroooo 
by Europeans, written shortly att.r the oonferenoe oomened, expnlaed the 
6 Edwvd Dioey, "Statement of I.ne. Involved," Eoleotl0 Jlae,ln., 
evIL, Aprl1, 1906, 329 • 
., E. J. Dillon, "Europe Retu ... to Reoognize an Overlori." 
Contsor!!l Review, LXXXIX, May.. 1906. 729. 
B Ibld., 734. 
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belief that trie Sult811 would m.erely oont!Jau, to play one for.iga ooUJl'bl7 
aga1nft another. a. he had done 121 the pan.9 Even should one nation be 
aarded the ript to Int_".e. great obataole. 'WOuld make this diffioult to 
o~ out. Foremost among the.e dlffioultl •• would be that of religlon, 
11noe the Sultan i. not olllJ' 'the temporal head of the oourmry. but al.o the 
religious head. Axr:i interterenoe by.France 01" allY' other ooun1:ll7' with their 
reUg1ou. leader might re.ult in .erioua riot. on the part of the native •• 
Geographio oonditlon. were al.o oon81dered unfavorable, due to the laek ot 
railroads. good road •• tele~aph line.. and bridge.. Furthermore. ta 
visuallzing Franoe at the head of the adm1Jl1etrati ve deptiU"'tment in .rooco 1# 
another problem ui.e •• namely that of enforcing the law. 1'Ih1oh they JU4e. 
Sheuld France pin eontrol of the ouetome hou.e., ahe would 8till find it 
neGe.aery to .eek additional taxe.. elaawhere. Bare. the trouble would 
"nainly begin. linoe the Sultan had alway. been foroed to uk for muG more 
than he needed in order to &88U1"8 hira.eU of getting the n ..... ary money.. art.d 
then he otbengot 1t. only aft.r .ending hi. foro •• out to oolleot it.10 nth 
th •• e in mind it 1. 11ttle wonder why any European oourmry would want to 
oontrol 1101"0000. 
!he American repre.entatlve. Henry White. expre.sed hl. oplnion ot 
the henoh e.nc1 German delegate. to the collteren_ by aaying • 
• elther Franoe DOl" o.rm.any aent me of fir.t rate abl11ty_ II. Paul 
9 E. Kontet, WUOl"oooan Queatlon.~ Outloo~, LXXXII, February 3. 
1906. 255. 
10 Ibid., 257. 
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., 
Revoll, the FrellCbman "flU In.geD1ou., subtle and word,. ln hi. argqm.ent., 
but .in" hi. gGvermaeniJ had l1ttle oontideno8 11l h1m. he n.a cout&J11Jly 
aot1ag under d1Hot order. from Pul.. The Ge:m.an. ..t Herr VOIl 
bAni t. and a.n a.s1.tazrb Oowm !attellbaoh. !a'bteribaeb '0011 took ehu'p 
... A was trmz-ight, ill-tem.pttred and tUlable to ••• fIZ1'1 point ot vi_ but 
hi ..... 
fo ud to the trying oond1tion. ot the conteren.e, Henry White 
pelat.d that the n_apa~r .en .... r. vetoy ~C to the delepte., "e'peola1 
the 'nnoh, who .. ere connantly pouaolng Oil th_ with queation •• "lJ fhi."... 
oontradiotol'Y to anoth.r .b.erva1:10. MAl, here 1D Juri_ whloh lauded the 
hench for "attempting 1;0 avoi'd war talk again.t de~ during the center, 
then'b,. _ldllg Gel"Dl8.D1 and not han., look like the aggre.sor. "11 
Ib .. the f1nal deol81oll was reached by the repr ••• 1Jatlve. of tbe 
Or ... 'b Powers, ish, treaty waa pre.ented to the U!lited State.' Senate tor 
ratifioatlon. thi. tr""7 waa ra'bit1ed and to it was added an explaaa'blou. 
that the particl patlon ot the UD1 t,4 Stat.. ill the .oat,renee .... du. to tbe 
taot tb .. t ebe hael I1p.d the t,.eaty of Jladrid in 18S0.14 AMl"ioa.... .tlU 
o1a1mS.ng. th •• , iIhat the:y .... ,.. 1apanlal and unin"reated t.n who _n t ..... OI" la 
lIoroooo, but ft. only bt.raned 1n upbo1418C the tnt.rational prin01ple, of 
'he Mattr1d treat,.. Bow.,. ... , the author i, nmftbat akeptloal. be11 .... 1ng we 
hac! a ctet1ai te inte.lon of helplng han... In 8U1IIIIlrialq 17.,1*" 
11 Allan • ..nu. 264. 
12 Ibid.. ITS. 
-
13 "Ou'boome.· »at10n, LXXXII, Aprl1 5, 1906. 271. 
14 Altred L. P. Denni., 510. 
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Roosevelt" polioy, he state ..... at people thought that Rooa~elt waa hand i 
glove with the Kal .. r, yet his tinal at8.l'1d .... unquestionably in support; of 
It 1. interesting to IIOte at this time, 'bhat Franoe who hftsitated 
111 agreeing to the conterenee. tared muoh better than hm.any, who had urgt'd 
Preaident Roo.evelt to obtain the oOmJent of France to the oontercoe. Not 
only did France gain aotual privl1ege', but alao the support; of many friena.a, 
among the.e the Amerleans. One author attributed thls auooe •• to "the 
moderation and juatioe of the Frenoh oontention at the Algt'olraa Conterenoe, 
wh10h have peen gradually but 8I1rely appealing to the good aen.e of the rest 
of the world, and 5. t may be .aid that the Frenoh cue i. could.rably bette 
ain" the oonterenoe openecl •• 15 
!he !!!!!!:! Times in 8U1IIID&1"1dng the opln1on of our delegate, 
Henry Whl t., atated. 
270. 
Jfr. White, the Amerioan delegate, is of the opinion that tho result 
of the oont.renee i. a8&tisfaoto17 one, not emly b.caus. the baHiat. 
future of Moroooo is aeour", but beoaus. the manner of the aettlament 
1. aati.1'acrtJory both to 'l'U1oe and Ge~, removes the cause, for 
friotion, aDd re.torea international relation. to a normal oondition. 
!he prinoiple, for whioh Gel"lDNlY inSisted, the integrlty of Meroooo an4 
~al oommeroial aDd eoonolde right' there, .... re rMogn1ZU' while the 
apeola1 position, olaimed by Franoe, also wa. reoognized. 
Little real1llng that the trouble wa_ not over in l(o:roooo b ..... 
16 !!! .!!!.!l'1aea. April 1, 1906. 
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the Frenoh EU'ld Germane, but was to continue on until 1911. ms:ny opt1mistice.lly 
observed at th.. cl0.. of the conferenoe that the peace of Europe had been 
... 
Slao. \he Algeolrae Conte rea.. dld Dot per.manoatly ..ttle the 
trouble ia Moroooo, thl. atucly would nOt be ooaploto without a brief ~ 
ot how France ... "hIe to lueee.ltully oarry out her pl_ ot ma.ld.Dg a 
proteoto~te ot ~rooto. 
Sbo"l,. affIer the oOllolualon ot the oontena". 4110rder. b:roke out 
la »oroooo 'IIh1oh France felt oallod tor lnton_t10D. 'lho firat ot theae 
oabt:>etJca ooourred wheD Sir 1Ie .. Z7 )faoLe., a Brlt1ah aubjeot, ftl captured b,. 
Ra1IUU., the bandit. an4 hold tor a nmeOJll ot It 20,.000.1 rul, ot cov,e, 
brought internatlonal attentloD aca11l 'to the )Io1"oooan l1tuatlOD. The seoond 
d1sturbanoe .ame about bHauee "'he Sultan ha4 bo .. ooatonlng wlth the 
Eur.peau ill order to COil ..... oerta1n priv1lege. and t:>lghtl to thea. Mulay 
liatld, a brother of the Sultan, organised s«eral warlike tribe. 1;0 rebel 
aga1Ut the Sultan. 1 Stl11 another cauo tor lnto~10D roaultec1 when at 
CaeabIee., the Sh.-1ya tr1be-"1l hoard that the French and Span1.h 1NN 
pIeum1ng to butld a railroad through a "'11_ ~ete1T. they lmmec11ate17 
invuK the tna and ldlled lIVeral Eunpeau, among _om were .... henchman • 
• u 
1 )focll, 201. 
I !!!.!!!!: fha •• , J'oveber 25, 1901. 
I Oooke and StlOkney, 112. 
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fhe Frel1Ob. retallatttd by •• 41ng an ~ ot three 'bhouear.u1aeu t. 
ooouW Caaablau.oa and the 'U1'T0W34ing tenltoJ"7. Strangely enough, the hZ'DU 
414 not rai.e a •• r10ul objection to the oooupatlAn ot Caaablanoa by the 
Frenoh. but; .e1'10u. eli"atisfaction wu Ihowa by the native., who agaiD ~LUI 
nth Jlu1ay Hatld to overthrow the Su11;an in 1908.' It n. little 'Cd .•• 
. 
how ..... r .. betor. the 11_ Sultan alao tUJ"l1l4 to the European. with teJ"JU .t 
oODOtt.l1onl, and agab the na1;1v8. rebeUed. When he triM to ral .. are 
moll87 by 1;axing the nat! ve. to pay an ln41D1111 ty to 'ranOtt tor the Vouble ai;, 
Ca_blanca .. the aapUJol wu at .. ked and the Sultan a.ked the rrenoh tor 
m1U tary help. The henoh ".ponded by di.patoh1ng ten thouaand. meD to oco1lP7 
i;he oapitol al'ty ot Fe.. In ezplainlDg their laten aotloll, the FFeoh 
deolared that .uob aot10l1 ft. n ..... ary to eateguard the live, of Eul"Opeau L. 
F •• againn attaokl by the natd.ve •• 1 
In the ...-hile, 1:11e pa •• ive attitude ah1blted bY' the GeftlaD. 'book 
on a d1tteren1; oharaoter. »e.erterl trOlll the Frenlth tONten legion were Mill, 
enoourage4 and helpe4 out ot Ca.abl_oa by a Gel"1DU orgenta.tie w1l1h 1;11. 
lmowledg. ot the GUll. eolUtul. !'he plan ft. not; IUCO'lllul, though, md th4t 
de.enerl, along w11;b 10_ ot 1;be Ge:r.at.an., were 8I'",..lted.6 'or. while U, 
looked a. it war mtght develop tl-om thil 1noldent, beoau.e the German. dAIuI14 
8D apology.. tbe rel .. se ot the de.erter. and oompeuatlon tor tbe rough 
, ~.!!.!:! ri.... January 12, 1908. 
6 Cooke anc1 Stiokney, 114. 
6 !!!.!!!!! riM.. September 17. 1908. 
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tr ...... given '0 the1r oap4nu-e4 ~ In tlbelr ".rela. 1t watt •• 
lnault w the 0. .... fl ... • The ""_. auppo~ by Eqlalld u4 au.ta. 
relwln to meet thoee 4eemt.. The whole prob1 •• t .01 ..... bJ pNnntlq So" 
W 1Jhe Hap. tnbunal. wb10b found the G,,.. pllty of a14ing d ............ 
the FPftuh pl1ty 1n DOt ~1rtg 1m ... heM FoteotlOB __ N1 .. by ,be 
-
ru8 latter 01"1.18 occurred 1Il 1109 8.Ild DO ~l' trouble 4eft1o,.. 
unb11 the Fnuh ooouplod the otty of I'e. ita 1911. Apla the GfmIau 
pme_ed, --1dn&. " ••• ehould ,"-nee o..,..,..t;ep t}w UlIlt. of the apeolt1e4 
pJ'O~ ••• we ehoul4 epa olaim our full ~_ ot ~1 .... ·8 
!hNe aoatha 1 .... the b'enoh att4 Span1. oooups._ the 01 t7 aD4 the 
o.naau ~ tho Fna .. had aoiled ap1net the Aot of Algeolrat. S1ft .. 
DO r.,00_t1_ wu given to ill. dtel.aNts._. ~ begaD to to~ .... 
plait, wtd.h she pnHll'MdthJtouch 'bhe Geran tore1p mlldmr, BtlerleD-
WMoh1ier. fh4t plan ooMined of ttuoee ftepa. the tlrn ftl to altc the Fro_ 
h_ loBI they latenW to ""1 Sa r... !he IROftd .. to ~ ~'1" 
tor ~. It tbey _"' go1Dg to atar, HoaUM tbt ... a violatt. of the 
Alpol .... Aot. l'.AItly. ~ would ... a WVIhlp to Aga41r u,*11 the 
ooapeaatlon.. tOl"fJho~." 
" Ch!!!e 1'ri~. 1IIIi\y IS, 1909. 
8 Cooke ar.t.cl ftle1c:aey. 1". 
, Ecip? T. ~'. ~ Dl:2~'le DoOUMlltll, LoDdDa, i&fthuAm 
and Co.. 1911. IV. I. 
On Jul,. 1, 19U the GeJ".lllU1 gunboat, Panther, atatiOl1ed it,elf at 
Age,4ir and IUge_ated tha1s the Frenoh Congo, trOJA 1she S..,. :alver to the 
.... oout, be gi TIn to Gel"JUll1. Franoe retu." the plan, adding tha1s thq 
wou14 not con.ider the prope.al ft'en it Ge~ thr_ in her oolOJl)l' of 
togeland and part of the Cameroon •• 10 
. 
Ge~ had _t reokoned with the polaible &Otton of Eng1ed, wb1eh 
oame almolt 1:mmediatel,.. Eng1aad feared that 'bheir naval plan. would be 
hindered 'by the pre.enee of Ge:rman boat. In 'bhe.e water. J 10 i;he,. amed 
Gel'DYU1)l' 'bhat auGh methodl would be _barralaing to her. it i;hq oont1JN.e4, 
and 'but auoh embanas.ent would not be tolerated.11 
I1der1en-Waeohter fiDall,. withdrew hia original plaB in Ootober, 
and on November 4th, 1911 the tollowing agre .. n'b waa reached. Franoe waa t. 
be allowed to interve. in IIoroooo, onoondltlon that all nations ehoulcl 
enj07 equaUty a. regards ounmu, 'barllt., 'bre.naporbation chargee and mining 
the iron "eour .. a of 1Ioroooo were to be .ett1ed by statlng 'bhat no tax Ru14 
be lald on the export of iron ore. GeJ"JDaD1' was to reoeive 100,000 equare 
mile. of heneh Congo.12 
Ger.lDllllJ.y wa. net at all ... tlafied, but a. the ltai.er had .aid 
earlier 1n .eoret documenta, 
the wrnohe4 Morooco aftair muat be brought to a oloae, quiokly and 
10 Gooch, 4?9. 
11 Oooke and Stiokney. 186. 
12 Erich Brandenburg, FI"OJI'l Bi ...... ok !!. ~ World War. London, 
Oxford UDlverlit,. Pr'aa, 1927, 38~ 
14 
tlully. io'bhUlg oa.tl b. don., .J"OOoo will b.... Frtmoh. 80 gM ouiJ 
~ the altalr graoef'ull.,', in ol"4er that .. mar n 1aft .114 the Met!oa 
wlth :rranoe, aow. when great qu.stion. are .t .... 11 
SaYlal r8I&We<t the a.,.,. oppol1ttoD at lut, FftUl" nat ooul4ere4 
the J'Nnoo-8pe.nlah trea'b7 OIl Bovcbe:r 27, 1911. !Me tHaty ino1wt. 1lbe 
tollowlag ,."11101'18' 
1. The l101"1ahen ooan, about 20Q mil .. loac 8I.l4 60 1111 •• 4eap, .. en 
apan .. a "Span1. aone,- 'b7 .. l1 ___ t of the Butta, W!Ida' 1Jhe 
eupen1a1on .t .. Spanlah lftgh Oommlulonft>. 
I. SpaiD._ to ..... 1 ....... p1 .... of twrltoJ'y in tbe Sou .... _Id.a, 
.. towl of t.bout 18.rK» Iqu8H JIll ... or .... ut; oa .... 1fth of tilt. IforoooeD ar... aa4 ..... eMh of the 'IIoI"o008ll pepulatlOD.. 
I. TlII'lgtor 8b4 140 aqU&H tdl •• ot aun"OutwSlng t..n.tory 'ft' 1;0 be 
iDteraatlonal1 .... 
4. The nft t4 the terr1toJy._ to be the Frene IOne.1t 
0. tmal nep .... 111.. 1n the J'renoh plan ttll' Mol'Ooco, and that 
coulated ot ma1d.ng • ", .. t,' with the Sultan. Thi. wa_ euooe •• tully 
aoocaplllhe4 on ..,..h 10, 1918 when the Sultan agrMd 'bo a lnAoh pJ"OWo~. 
OIl the oon41 tion that he be ,.et;a1u4 .. the nominal ruler.ll Another 
rebell101l followed when the lloroeotm pol!. .. _tWed end ld.UfJd eighty lTellOh-
me In Fe.. !hi. ftl put down after some trouble end the , .. ott offered the 
Sultan a pflnalQft ",0 N81&21. which he acoep1ied. an(l hi. brother Ifulay '!UHf' 
8OGoeed_ to the 1.'hrcme.16 'lbe h4m.Clh Ina prartoUI experiet'JA.Mt thought lt 
ben 'bo keep .. Datlve NI.r at the head of the pwrmunt in hopea of 
paolfy1ng the native. ln that _,.. 
11 Moen. 110. 
14 Amerlcu JoU1"tl&J. !! Intenational Law, VII, 81. 
15 .Alavi .. J~ !! Int .... 'lf11lA} !:!!r" VI, IO? 
16 !!! l!.!J! f1M,s. Auguet 12, 1912. 
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The~f1nal renouncaa«at ot aD1 German cla1m8 to IOrocco came in the 
Veraal11e. treaty, when the German colonie. were taken ... y ttoa her. 
thua ia conoluded • story of riYal imperlali_, which i8 .red!.t" 
by Ilf1Zly hiatorians •• a cauae tor the Great War, which !nvolnd moat ot the 
European oeuxrbrle. in etruggle for world domination in the early twentieth 
oentury. It was not jut e. oontUot ,between han .. and GeZ'Jlllln1 tor oontrol of 
a north Atrican couatry, but an tnternational ori.i., reaultlng trom several 
earlier alliance. and. .ecret proalse. of oompenaatlona to tho.e who "ere not 
direotly involved. 
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